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INTRODUCTION
The Bill of Rights, framed in an atmosphere of great mistrust of a
1
potentially oppressive government, not only enunciates broad principles limiting the powers of the federal government, such as due
2
process of law, but also includes more particularized rules to safeguard individual liberty. The Sixth Amendment, for example, guards
3
against unjustified deprivations of life and liberty by mandating that
the federal government provide seven specific procedural protections
4
to all those accused of committing a crime.
Over the course of the two centuries since its ratification, but particularly during the last few decades, the scope and meaning of the
Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections have undergone significant development. While the Warren Court era was marked by the
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment and by largely expansive
readings of the Sixth Amendment, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
adopted decidedly more restrictive readings of the Amendment.
During the course of this jurisprudential development, the Court
has adopted a number of constructions of the Sixth Amendment that
plainly contravene its text and are increasingly less protective of individual liberty. For example, contrary to the textual mandate that defendants in “all” criminal prosecutions be provided the seven procedural protections, the Court has held that the rights to jury trial and
1

2

3

4

See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1140 (1992)
(describing the fear of Anti-Federalists that the government would be controlled by the
aristocracy and would rule through corruption and force); Erik G. Luna, The Models of
Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 398 (1999) (“[A]ll criminal procedure rights
share a common purpose—limiting the means by which government can investigate,
prosecute, and punish crime.”); George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide:
Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 157
(2001) (“Fear of a powerful central government led the drafters to give the new government specific powers, with the idea that all other powers and functions remained with the
States.”).
See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747,
769 (1991) (“[O]ne need not be a radical deconstructionist to believe that the openended phraseology of many of the Constitution’s most litigated provisions resists determinate interpretation.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of
Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1556 (2008) (“[I]n drafting the Constitution, the
Framers were not enacting a series of specific and predetermined rules. . . . [D]ue process
[was] not designed as [a] crabbed, narrow-minded ordinance[] like [a] speed limit[].
Rather, [it was] intended to serve as [an] open-ended aspiration[] that would gain meaning and vitality over time.”).
See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (“The [jury trial] clause was clearly
intended to protect the accused from oppression by the Government . . . .” (citation omitted)).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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counsel need to be provided only in a limited subset of criminal
prosecutions, and that too in differing subsets. Even the Court’s textually inconsistent expansive readings of the rights to public trial and
compulsory process, extending the former to pre-trial proceedings
and including in the latter a right to have witnesses testify, have ironically opened the door to textually inconsistent restrictive readings of
the Sixth Amendment.
The textually inconsistent, restrictive interpretations of the Sixth
Amendment pose a significant problem irrespective of what theory of
constitutional interpretation one ascribes to because constitutional
5
text is a necessary beginning point. While the text, including that of
the Sixth Amendment, is not always unambiguously clear, where it is,
that plain meaning constitutes a minimal baseline in protection of
6
individual liberty. Whatever one might think about the propriety of
the Court’s finding that the Sixth Amendment provides greater protections of individual liberty than the text might seem to suggest, it is

5

This Article does not claim that the Sixth Amendment’s text provides the means to resolve all interpretive issues. Indeed, as scholars have noted “[t]he text did not come with
a user’s guide or a set of instructions for interpretation. As noted by Judge Richard Posner, ‘The Constitution does not say, “Read me broadly,” or, “Read me narrowly.”’” Luna,
supra note 1, at 422 (footnote omitted). In fact, “[s]cholars generally agree that a number of tools are available to interpret the Constitution, including the text itself, original
intent, constitutional structure, judicial precedents, and contemporary values.” Id. at 394.
This Article, however, does begin with the premise that the text is the proper starting
point in constitutional interpretation. See Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of
Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1998) (stating that “lawyers and judges must often go beyond the letter of the law, but the text itself is an obvious starting point of legal
analysis”); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1995) (calling “for an
unabashed return to rigor and precision in the interpretive process—for a commitment
to take text and structure seriously”); see also Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the
Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 327 (2005) (“Textualists think the constitutional text is the ‘touchstone’ of constitutional meaning . . .” (citation omitted)); Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead Constitution, SLATE, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2125226 (arguing that a “living
Constitution requires that judges faithfully apply the constitutional text, given the meanings the words had when they were first enacted, applying those words to today’s circumstances”).

6

This primacy of the plain meaning of the text is contingent on its being consistent with
the history and purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Where a plain reading of the text
conflicts with the history or purposes of the Amendment, adopting a purely textual interpretation might be unwise. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 153 (1997) (noting that a purely textual argument sometimes must yield to arguments based on history, structure, precedent, or practicality).
None of the textual readings of the Sixth Amendment offered in this Article are inconsistent with the purposes or history of the Sixth Amendment.
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difficult to claim that the Sixth Amendment provides lesser protections of individual liberty than that evident from a plain reading of
the text.
The Court’s problematic textually inconsistent restrictive readings
of the Sixth Amendment can be traced to the interplay between the
Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. In some instances, the Court has entangled the two constitutional provisions in the process of incorporating the Sixth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
leading the Court to adopt some textually inconsistent restrictive
readings arguably in order to mitigate the impact of incorporation on
the states. In other instances, the Court has entangled the two constitutional provisions by improperly locating expansive procedural protections in the rules of the Sixth Amendment as opposed to deriving
the same rights from the general principle of Due Process, ironically
opening the door to possible restrictive reading of the Sixth Amendment in the future. Finally, the Court has entangled the two constitutional provisions by improperly using Due Process interpretative methodologies to give meaning to the Sixth Amendment, leading to
textually inconsistent restrictive readings.
In addition to providing a doctrinal framework for the textually
inconsistent restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment, this Article
proposes alternate, textually sound constructions in light of the recent noteworthy development in the Court’s criminal procedure ju7
risprudence. While commentators have celebrated or decried two
7

This Article only addresses those instances of entanglement where there is a compelling
textual alternative. There remain other entanglements not addressed here. For example, in determining whether the right to counsel applies at pre-trial proceedings, the
Court has adopted a “critical stages” test. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317–21
(1973); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1970). Under the “critical stages” test, the
right to counsel applies to “those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the
merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 122 (1975). Put somewhat differently, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at “any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s
absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.” United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). Under these formulations, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is limited to stages where the defendant’s defense would be impaired or where
the fair trial may be derogated. Impairment and derogation of a fair trial, however, are
due process concerns. Similarly, the Court has entangled the Sixth Amendment in the
context of the right to counsel during interrogations. The Court has held that the government may not deliberately elicit statements from an indicted defendant in the absence
of counsel. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). However, the scope of
this protection has been limited to interrogations pertaining to the same offense. To define which offenses are the same, the Court has imported its Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy jurisprudence. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172–73 (2001); McNeil v. Wis-
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8

landmark opinions—Apprendi v. New Jersey and Crawford v. Washing9
ton —and their progeny as having affected fundamental change in
the Court’s sentencing and Confrontation Clause jurisprudence respectively, the Article suggests that these seminal decisions are more
properly understood as being part of a common enterprise—the
Court’s commitment to disentangle the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments and to reclaim the textual core of the Sixth Amendment.
In Part I, the Article sets forth a historical account of the Court’s
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, highlighting the Court’s recent expansive and restrictive readings of the various procedural protections
that have led to the entanglement of the Sixth Amendment. In Part
II, the Article discusses the two recent seminal developments in the
Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence that have entailed disentangling the Sixth Amendment from the Due Process Clause. In Part
III, this Article identifies the remaining textually inconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment that can be traced to the Court’s entanglement of the Sixth Amendment and proposes alternate readings, ones that are more faithful to the text of the Sixth Amendment
10
and more protective of individual liberty.

8

9

10

consin, 501 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1991). The importation of the double jeopardy test set
forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), however, is an unnecessary
entanglement of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. A more intellectually appealing
alternative to the Blockburger rule would be to view a criminal prosecution as including all
the acts or transactions that are “closely related” to the instant prosecution. See Cobb, 532
U.S. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“We can, and should, define ‘offense’ in terms of the
conduct that constitutes the crime that the offender committed on a particular occasion,
including criminal acts that are ‘closely related to’ or ‘inextricably intertwined with’ the
particular crime set forth in the charging instrument.”); see also Melissa Minas, Note, Blurring the Line: Impact of Offense-Specific Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 195, 218–22 (2002) (arguing that the Court unnecessarily reduced the
Sixth Amendment protections by replacing the workable “closely related” test with the
more restrictive Blockburger test).
530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that due process requires that any fact increasing criminal
penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond
reasonable doubt).
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of a
testimonial hearsay statement unless the witness is unavailable and was previously subject
to cross-examination).
While this Article suggests that various rights, such as the right to public pre-trial proceedings, have been improperly located in the Sixth Amendment, it does not advocate that
these rights lack constitutional bases. On the contrary, these rights are properly located
in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See generally Akhil
Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807 (1997) (arguing that
some interpretative problems in the Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence can be
avoided by locating those rights in the Due Process Clause); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on

492

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:3

I. THE PATH TRAVELLED: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE COURT’S
SIXTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Sixth Amendment, proposed by James Madison in 1789 and
11
ratified in 1791, requires the federal government to provide seven
specific procedural protections to all those it accuses of committing a
crime: the right to a speedy trial; the right to a public trial; the right
to a trial before an impartial jury drawn in a prescribed manner; the
right to notice; the right of confrontation; the right to compulsory
12
process; and the right to assistance of counsel.
Despite the broad reach of these procedural safeguards, there
were relatively few Supreme Court cases of significance involving the
13
Sixth Amendment for over a century after its ratification. In fact,
the only provision of the Sixth Amendment that the Court dealt with
during this period was the right to a jury trial: in a series of decisions
towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Court circumscribed
the scope of the right to a jury trial, finding that the right did not ex14
tend to the trial of petty crimes.
The dearth of Sixth Amendment cases during this period is not
surprising. Since most crimes were prosecuted by states, to whom the
15
Bill of Rights did not apply, and since there was a significant limita-

11

12
13

14

15

Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C.
L. REV. 1559 (1996) (arguing for a robust reading of the Due Process Clause and advocating for due process of law as the appropriate means for resolving uncertainty in constitutional criminal procedure).
Penny J. White, “He Said,” “She Said,” and Issues of Life and Death: The Right to Confrontation
at Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 387, 397 n.46 (2007) (describing
the history of the Sixth Amendment and the development of its language).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi’s Domain, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 342 (“[T]here was very
little case law interpreting the Sixth Amendment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries . . . .”).
See generally District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States,
195 U.S. 65 (1904); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540 (1888).
See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that
the Fifth Amendment only limits the federal government and is not applicable to state
governments). There were also significant procedural hurdles preventing state court defendants from using collateral proceedings to appeal to the Supreme Court. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441, 465 (1963) (“[U]ntil 1867 (and with exceptions not relevant here) there was no federal habeas jurisdiction to inquire into detentions pursuant to state law. Further, even after the act of 1867 established such a jurisdiction, the Supreme Court could make no
pronouncements in cases of state detention because the Court’s appellate jurisdiction
under the act of 1867 was removed in 1868 and not reestablished until 1885. Thus dur-
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tion on a defendant’s ability to challenge a federal conviction, there
was little occasion for the Court to interpret the mandates of the
Sixth Amendment. This was true even during the Reconstruction Era
despite the enactment of a statute geared at expanding state defen17
dants’ access to federal courts.
While the first few decades of the twentieth century witnessed a
marked evolution in the Court’s willingness to apply Due Process lim18
its on state criminal procedures and practices, this jurisprudential
change did not involve the Sixth Amendment, whose provisions re19
mained unincorporated. There were only two significant developments, both involving the right to counsel—the Court read the right
to counsel expansively to include an obligation for the federal gov-

16

17

18

19

ing the first century of the Constitution the Court had no occasion to deal with the scope
of the habeas jurisdiction for state prisoners.” (footnotes omitted)).
See Bator, supra note 15, at 473 n.75 (“Until 1889 federal criminal cases were reviewable
by the Supreme Court only when there was a division of opinion in the circuit court on a
question of law.”).
See id. at 478–93 (discussing the early cases involving habeas corpus jurisdiction for state
prisoners); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2337–38
(1993) (“[O]ne of the most significant enactments of the Reconstruction era, the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867, extended that jurisdiction to cases in which petitioners charged they
were unlawfully detained by state officials. . . . In the wake of Reconstruction, habeas
helped shape the relations between the federal government and the states.” (footnotes
omitted)); id. at 2339–40 (“Still, as late as the notorious Leo Frank case, Frank v. Mangum,
the Court repeated the confused boilerplate that had attached itself to the writ over the
preceding century. . . . [and] federal habeas was open only if the state court had exceeded its jurisdiction—if it had ceased to act as a court.” (footnotes omitted)).
During the early years of the twentieth century, even as the Court was reading the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause broadly to strike down state economic regulations, it did not take the same robust view of the Due Process Clause to intervene in state
criminal prosecutions. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner
and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (2003) (“If the
Lochner era unofficially began in 1897 . . . and ended in 1937 . . . , then twenty-six Justices
served on the Lochner era Court over a period of forty years. The vast majority of these
Justices were at least moderate Lochnerians in the sense that they believed the Court
should engage in meaningful review of regulatory legislation that interfered with the liberty of contract to ensure that such legislation was constitutionally valid as an exercise of
the states’ police powers.”). This changed over time, perhaps due to the shocking legacy
of thousands of lynchings and mob trials, and the Court issued a series of decisions overturning state convictions. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (coerced confessions); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (discrimination in juries); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (perjury); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (counsel
in capital cases); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (financially-biased judge); Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-dominated trials); see also Klarman, supra note 2, at
764 (“The vast majority of the Court’s first constitutional interventions in state criminal
procedure involved the Jim Crow ‘justice’ southern states meted out to black defendants.”); Yackle, supra note 17, at 2341 (“The meaning of due process developed rapidly
between the two world wars.”).
See Yackle, supra note 17, at 2341.
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ernment to appoint counsel for indigent defendants and to include
21
the requirement that the assistance provided by counsel be effective.
It was not until the Warren Court era that the Court’s Sixth
22
Amendment jurisprudence witnessed significant development. Perhaps most importantly, over the course of several years, the Court in23
corporated the various provisions of the Sixth Amendment, finding
for the most part that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause guaranteed defendants in state courts the same fundamental
procedural protections guaranteed by the Framers to defendants in
24
federal courts. Ironically, this process of incorporation, properly
20
21

22

23

24

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding that indigent criminal defendants in
federal court are entitled by the Sixth Amendment to court-appointed counsel).
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1942) (holding that “the ‘assistance of counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously
represent conflicting interests”). This reading of the Sixth Amendment was reiterated by
the Court in subsequent cases. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (reasserting that “defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of
competent counsel”).
The Warren Court’s “criminal procedure revolution” can be seen as a reaction both to
“pervasive legislative abdication of criminal procedure rulemaking”—for example, for
more than two decades Congress failed to take any action to implement the Court’s decision requiring the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants—and to “disparate
class and racial impact” of criminal prosecutions. Klarman, supra note 2, at 764–67.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967) (compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy
trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel). While the Court’s earlier opinions in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948), and Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948), do not make this clear, in later years
the Court has seen them as having incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s rights to public
trial and notice, respectively. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 n.7 (1975) (citing the two cases as having incorporated the respective Sixth Amendment rights); see also
Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635, 647
(1999) (“The Warren Court cases indeed worked a revolution in the administration of
justice in the states. The revolution, however, took the doctrinal form of incorporating
the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
There have been only two exceptions to this “jot-for-jot” approach to incorporation. First,
despite the long-standing understanding that the right to a jury trial meant the right to a
unanimous jury verdict, Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) (“Unanimity in
jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.”), the Court
has held that this unanimity requirement is not applicable to state prosecutions, Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Similarly, the Court held that while a twelve-person jury
was required in federal prosecutions, juries in state prosecutions could be composed of
fewer than twelve persons. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In a series of subsequent decisions, the Court set forth the due process limitations on jury size and anonymity in state prosecutions. In particular, the Court subsequently held that juries in state
courts must be comprised of a minimum of six persons, Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223
(1978), and that non-unanimous verdicts in state prosecutions would be unconstitutional
if they were the product of six-person juries, Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
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seen as an expansive reading of the Due Process Clause as opposed to
an expansive reading of the Sixth Amendment, provided the impetus
25
for later restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment.
The Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence was also significantly affected by the Warren Court’s removal of the jurisprudential
handcuffs that had been imposed on the federal courts’ ability to remedy constitutional violations through the great writ of habeas cor26
pus. The Court’s subsequent decision to subject constitutional violations—not violations of mere ordinances or rules or statutes, but
27
violations of the Constitution—to harmless error analysis too had an
28
important effect on the Sixth Amendment.
In addition to these procedural developments affecting the Sixth
Amendment, the Warren Court era was marked by expansive substantive readings of the Sixth Amendment. For instance, the Court read
the Confrontation Clause to prohibit the use, in a joint trial, of a nontestifying co-defendant’s confession notwithstanding the trial court’s
cautionary instructions that the confession was being admitted
29
against the co-defendant only. It also read the right to counsel expansively, extending its scope to pre-trial proceedings such as ar30
31
32
raignments, some post-arrest and post-indictment interrogations,

25

26

27

28

29
30
31

Therefore, while both 9-3 and 5-1 jury verdicts are unconstitutional in federal prosecutions, only the latter are unconstitutional in state prosecutions.
See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing
that the Court’s opinion “dilute[d] a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of
‘incorporation,’ the ‘jot-for-jot and case-for-case’ application of the federal right to the
States, with the reality of federalism”).
See Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1057, 1066 (2002) (describing the Warren Court’s efforts to improve oversight of state
courts by expanding state prisoners’ rights to challenge their convictions in federal
court).
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (allowing courts to deny relief even if a defendant demonstrates a constitutional violation if the government proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the violation did not affect the jury’s verdict).
While the development of harmless error analysis might be viewed as a restrictive development from an ex post perspective insofar as it limits the universe of defendants who
would be entitled to relief upon a showing of a constitutional violation, from an ex ante
perspective it is arguably an expansive development. This is because it makes more likely
that courts will deem offending state practices to be unconstitutional—a court after all
could find that a violation occurred, but need not worry that resources would be needlessly expended by mandating a retrial of a clearly guilty defendant—which in turn enhances the prescriptive value of the constitutional rule, making future compliance with
that rule more likely.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53–54 (1961).
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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33

and post-indictment lineups, finding that it applied irrespective of a
34
defendant’s request for counsel, and creating a per se exclusionary
rule prohibiting the use of testimony of some uncounseled identifica35
tions. Finally, the Court read expansively the right to compulsory
process and struck down a statute that created a per se rule against
the admissibility of testimony by persons who had participated in the
36
crime with the defendant.
This is not to say that the Warren Court read all Sixth Amendment provisions broadly. For example, notwithstanding the Sixth
Amendment’s text that provides that the right to a jury trial is to be
provided “In all criminal prosecutions,” when the Court incorporated
the right to jury trial, it cited prior precedent to hold that the right
37
applies only to trials of non-petty crimes. While the Court subsequently read the right to jury trial to include criminal contempt pro38
ceedings, it excluded “petty” contempt proceedings. Nevertheless,
overall, the Warren Court is properly seen as having taken an expan39
sive approach to the Sixth Amendment.

32

33
34
35
36
37

38

39

Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). But see Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168
(2001) (“[A] defendant’s statements regarding offenses for which he had not been
charged [are] admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel on other charged offenses.”); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431
(1986) (“[Although] the government may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements
from an accused out of the presence of counsel . . . [,] evidence concerning the crime for
which the defendant had not been indicted . . . would be admissible at a trial limited to
those charges.” (citation omitted)); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16 (1985)
(“Incriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment
right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those offenses.”).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967).
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273–74 (1967).
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Burger and Rehnquist Courts reaffirmed
this reading of the right to jury trial. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538
(1989) (holding that any offense, even one deemed “serious” like a DUI, is still “petty” if
the authorized maximum sentence is six months or less); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 69 (1970) (plurality opinion) (deciding that no offense can be labeled “petty” if more
than a six-month sentence is authorized).
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210 (1968); see also Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147,
149–50 (1969) (holding that there is no right to jury trial for criminal contempt proceeding where actual sentence imposed was less than six months).
While the Warren Court’s expansive approach to the procedural protections granted by
the Sixth Amendment reflected a commitment to safeguarding individual liberty, the
same “proceduralism . . . reflected an avoidance and suppression of the substantive conflicts underlying many of its great cases.” Kimberlé Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The Contradictions of Mainstream Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1683, 1713 (1998) (arguing
that while the Warren Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), granted
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There was a fundamental shift in the Court’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence during the Burger Court era from one that stressed
ensuring governmental compliance with the procedural protections
guaranteed to defendants by the Sixth Amendment to one that was
40
increasingly deferential of law enforcement efforts. This fundamental realignment of the Court’s jurisprudential approach was evident
not only in its imposition of significant obstacles with regard to the
ability of federal courts to remedy constitutional violations in habeas
41
proceedings, but also in its more restrictive view of constitutional
42
procedural protections in criminal cases.
The Court’s restrictive construction of the Sixth Amendment
manifested itself in different forms. In some cases, the restrictive
construction was a result of the Court’s limitation of the scope of the
right. For example, the Burger Court narrowed the class of cases to
which the right to jury trial applies, finding that it did not apply to
43
44
probation revocation hearings, juvenile court proceedings, or contempt proceedings where the sentences imposed were subsequently
45
reduced to the equivalent of a single term of six months. The Court
similarly narrowed the scope of the right to counsel: while the Court
46
rejected states’ efforts to limit the right to counsel for petty crimes,
it restricted the right to felonies and those misdemeanor cases where

40

41
42

43
44
45
46

welfare recipients the right to a hearing if their benefits were reduced or eliminated, the
decision did not address the underlying problem of economic disempowerment).
See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968) (describing the competing due process and crime control models of American criminal procedure); Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983) (arguing that the Burger Court’s
treatment of the Warren Court’s major criminal procedure decisions reflected an ideological shift toward a “crime control” theory of the criminal justice system); Donald A.
Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591 (1990) (providing a critique of
the modern conservative perspective on the major Warrant Court criminal procedure decisions); see also Luna, supra note 1, at 400 (noting that while neither model identified by
Packer “corresponds to reality[,] they . . . provide a serviceable method of discussing a
context-specific system that fluctuates on a daily basis”).
See Smith, supra note 26, at 1070 (arguing that limiting federal habeas corpus review was a
“top priority” for the Burger Court).
Id. (“[M]any Warren Court precedents were curtailed or at least not significantly extended, and the Court’s application of Warren-era precedents began to take on a distinctly more prosecution-friendly flavor.”).
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984).
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
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47

the defendant is imprisoned. The Court also limited the scope of
the right to counsel by finding that it did not apply to parole or pro48
bation revocation hearings or to post-arrest lineups conducted be49
fore the initiation of adverse judicial proceedings.
In other instances, the restrictive reading was due to the Burger
Court’s incorporation within the definitional elements of a constitutional right of a requirement that defendants show that they were
harmed; the absence of harm precluded the finding of a constitutional violation, in essence making these rights turn on the defen50
dant’s potential guilt or innocence. For example, one of the four
factors set forth by the Court for determining whether the right to
speedy trial is violated is whether the defendant can demonstrate that
51
the delay was prejudicial. Similarly, irrespective of how deficient an
attorney’s performance is, a defendant generally cannot establish a
violation of the right to counsel without demonstrating that the coun52
sel’s deficient performance was prejudicial.

47

48
49
50

51
52

Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); see also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 223 (1980)
(holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction cannot be used to enhance the
sentence of a subsequent misdemeanor conviction to include incarceration), overruled on
other grounds by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion).
While the Warren Court, too, had required a showing of harm through the adoption of
the harmless error doctrine, that came into play only with regard to remedies—that is,
only after defendants established a constitutional violation were courts to consider
whether that error was harmful enough to warrant relief. By incorporating the harm
element into the definition of the constitutional right, the Burger Court made it more
difficult to establish a violation of the right, which had the effect not only of reducing the
normative value of the right, but also of making the same textual right more meaningful
for innocent defendants than for those who might be guilty. In addition, the Burger
Court’s approach shifted the burden of proof—rather than have the state bear the burden of showing that the constitutional violation was harmless as required by the Warren
Court’s harmless error doctrine, the Burger Court required the defendant to show the
harmfulness of the violation.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); see also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,
316 (1986).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (requiring a defendant to show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by that deficient
performance); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981) (finding that relief
was not warranted for a violation of the right to counsel in a case, despite a deliberate
government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, because the defendant failed
to show “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”). But see United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (holding that prejudice may be presumed when counsel is
completely absent, is prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the
proceeding, or fails to subject the state’s case to adversarial testing); Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (finding no showing of prejudice is required when counsel was
not permitted to consult with defendant during an overnight recess).
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In a similar vein, the Burger Court read the right of confrontation
restrictively by incorporating within its definitional elements a showing of unreliability. In particular, the Court held that the use of outof-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e.
hearsay statements, did not offend the Confrontation Clause despite
the lack of opportunity for the defendant to confront the source of
the underlying statement not only if the statement fell within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, but also if the statement bore particular53
ized indicia of reliability.
The foregoing is not to suggest that the Burger Court uniformly
read Sixth Amendment rights restrictively. On the contrary, there
were numerous notable expansive readings of the Sixth Amendment
during this period. For example, the Court enunciated a broad vision of the right to a jury trial, finding that it included a right to have
the jury venire—the pool of potential jurors from which the petit jury
54
is selected—reflect a fair cross-section of society. The Court also
read the right to jury trial broadly to require that the trial court ask
55
race-specific questions during voir dire in some cases. It also read
56
the Public Trial Clause expansively to include pre-trial proceedings.
In addition, the Court reaffirmed the primacy of the Confrontation
Clause by finding that a state’s policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency records did not supersede the right
57
to cross-examine witnesses. The Court also read the right to counsel
58
59
expansively to extend to critical stages prior to trial, post53
54

55

56
57
58

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The
Rehnquist Court subsequently held that this fair cross-section requirement is limited to
the venire from which the jury is selected; it does not extend to the actual jury seated.
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (finding in an interracial capital case that the trial
court erred in failing to inform prospective jurors of the victim’s race and questioning
them on issues of racial bias); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (finding that
the trial court erred in not asking race-related questions in a case where civil rights issues
were raised). But see Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (using supervisory powers to require that federal courts ask race-related questions in non-capital, interracial cases where there is a “reasonable probability” that racial or ethnic prejudice will
bias the jury); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) (finding no error in failure to ask
race-related questions in a non-capital case involving an interracial crime because race
was not integral to the issues in the case).
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (finding that the closure of a suppression hearing
violated a defendant’s right to public trial).
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
The Court, however, restrictively construed the remedy for a violation of this right, holding that the denial of counsel at critical stages would be subject to harmless error analysis
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60

arraignment interrogations, post-indictment conversations with po61
62
lice informants, and pre-trial psychiatric examinations; to include
63
the right to conflict-free representation; to include the right of the
64
defendant to self-representation; and to be the proper subject of a
claim for habeas relief even regarding an attorney’s incompetent rep65
resentation with respect to a Fourth Amendment issue. Finally, the
Court read the Speedy Trial Clause expansively in holding that the
only remedy for a speedy trial violation is the dismissal of the indict66
ment with prejudice.
Nevertheless, while the Burger Court did read some provisions
expansively, there was a discernible shift towards a restrictive reading
of the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, paradoxically, a number of the
Burger Court’s expansive readings actually opened the door to future
67
restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment.
The Rehnquist Court, while imposing significantly greater procedural hurdles than the Burger Court with regard to the ability of federal courts to effectively remedy constitutional violations in habeas
68
proceedings, largely mirrored the Burger Court’s jurisprudential

59
60

61

62
63

64
65
66
67
68

rather than result in automatic reversal. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10–11
(1970) (remanding the case to the trial court for determination of whether denial of
counsel was harmless error).
Id.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977). A defendant may, however, be questioned
after invoking the right to counsel if the defendant initiates the communication. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274–75
(1980) (holding it is a violation of the right to counsel when police placed a paid informant in the same jail cell as defendant for purposes of obtaining a statement).
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469–71 (1981).
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (holding that prejudice is presumed when
counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,
484–85 (1978) (holding that no showing of prejudice is required when, despite defense
counsel’s pretrial warnings of conflict, the trial court failed to inquire into counsel’s conflict of interest).
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986).
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
See discussion of the entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause infra Part III.B and
discussion of the entanglement of the Public Trial Clause infra Part III.C.
See Smith, supra note 26, at 1076 (“Although habeas corpus remains available for relitigation of the constitutionality of state-court convictions, reversal on habeas has become a
prospect that state courts simply need not be concerned with in the vast majority of cases.”).
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approach to the Sixth Amendment—while the Court read some pro69
visions expansively, it read many other provisions restrictively.
In a pair of decisions during the earlier years of the Rehnquist
Court, the Court read the Compulsory Process Clause restrictively,
subjugating it to policy considerations. First, the Court held that the
exclusion of testimony as a sanction for defense counsel’s deliberate
failure to comply with a discovery request did not deny the defendant’s Compulsory Process right to have witnesses testify because
“[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testi70
mony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system.”
Second, the Court held that this right was not violated by the exclusion of evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual relationship with the
witness because of the defendant’s failure to comply with the notice
71
and hearing requirement of the state rape-shield statute. Ironically,
these restrictive readings of Compulsory Process were predicated on
72
the earlier expansive reading of this clause by the Burger Court.
Just a year after the Rehnquist Court read the Sixth Amendment
expansively in finding that the Confrontation Clause was violated
when a screen shielded a child witness from the defendant during
73
testimony, a sharply divided Court read the right to confrontation
restrictively in a similar situation. Specifically, holding that a defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation must give way when “necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured,” the Court held that the
clause was not violated by a statute that allowed a witness to be examined in a separate room from the defendant, with the testimony be74
ing televised to the courtroom.

69

70
71
72
73
74

Scholars have pointed to a number of external factors as possible explanations for the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ adoption of a restrictive view of the Sixth Amendment.
Some have pointed to increased crime and increased politicization of crime. See Yackle,
supra note 27, at 2349 (“The crime rate was rising, people were frightened, and society
needed someone or something to blame. Eyes fell on the Court, which was suspected of
abusing its authority to protect the rights of criminal suspects and placing law-abiding
citizens at risk.”). Others have alluded to other socioeconomic developments. See Thomas, supra note 1. Still others have attributed the change in jurisprudence to the natural
consequences of a change in the Court’s personnel, reflecting a change in judicial philosophy or ideology, such as increased sensitivity to federalism concerns. See Archibald
Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1978).
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 412–13 (1988) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States
v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975)).
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991).
See discussion of the entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause infra Part III.B.
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988).
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
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The Rehnquist Court largely read the right to counsel restrictively,
with some notable expansive readings of the right during the final
years of the Court. The Court read the Sixth Amendment narrowly
75
with respect to the right to effective assistance of counsel, the right
76
to conflict-free representation, the right to elicit statements using
77
informants, the imposition of hurdles in the defendant’s ability to
78
79
pay counsel’s fees, and the scope of the right to counsel. At the
same time, particularly towards the end of the Court’s era, the
Rehnquist Court did read the right to counsel broadly with respect to
80
81
the scope of the right to counsel, effective assistance of counsel,
82
and use of statements elicited in violation of the right to counsel.
75

76

77

78

79
80

81

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2003) (per curiam) (holding counsel was not ineffective because decisions to omit certain arguments and to mention defendant’s bad
character traits to show their irrelevance was a reasonable tactical approach); Bell v.
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 700 (2002) (finding that counsel was not ineffective because of a
failure to recall witnesses, and determining that the waiver of a final statement was a strategic decision because counsel was fearful that presenting mitigating evidence would give
the prosecution opportunity for a damaging attack).
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172–74 (2002) (holding that the trial court’s failure to
inquire into a known potential conflict of interest did not warrant reversal of conviction
because the defendant did not show that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348–49 (1990) (holding that while statements obtained in violation of right to counsel are inadmissible as evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, they are admissible for purposes of impeachment); Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (finding that the right to counsel was not violated by a failure
to grant the defendant a waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel and by a refusal to
permit the defendant’s proposed substitution of attorneys, because courts have an independent duty to protect against potential conflicts of interest); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S.
776, 783 (1987) (finding that concurrent representation is not per se a violation of the
right to effective assistance of counsel).
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 440, 460–61 (1986) (holding that there is no violation
of the right to counsel, because the government merely placed the informant in the cell,
the conversation was entirely spontaneous, the informant asked no questions, and the police told the informant only to listen for the identities of the accomplices).
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (finding that the right to
counsel was not violated by a forfeiture statute that prevented the payment of attorneys’
fees); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615 (1989) (finding that the right to
counsel was not violated by freezing assets that the defendant wanted to use to pay attorneys’ fees).
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 173–74 (1991) (finding that the right to counsel is
offense-specific and does not provide any protection for unrelated, uncharged offenses).
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (finding that the right to counsel applies even if
the sentence imposed is suspended); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (noting that the
right to counsel extends to uncharged offenses that are considered the same under the
Blockburger test).
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (“[E]ven when a capital defendant’s family
members and the defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that
counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sen-
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The Rehnquist Court’s expansive readings were most pronounced
in the context of the right of confrontation, particular as to the use of
83
84
hearsay evidence, the right to cross-examination, and the use of a
85
non-testifying confession at a joint trial. The Court also read the
Speedy Trial Clause expansively by finding a violation even where the
86
defendant could not show particularized harm due to the delay. In
contrast to these expansive readings of the Sixth Amendment, the
87
Court largely read the right to jury trial restrictively.

82

83
84

85

86
87

tencing phase of trial.”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519 (2003) (finding that counsel’s decision not to present mitigating evidence must be based on reasonable investigation); Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203–04 (2001) (holding that counsel’s error
at the sentencing phase, which resulted in a sentence increase of six to twenty-one
months, could be sufficiently prejudicial to constitute ineffective assistance, provided that
counsel’s performance was unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395, 397
(2000) (finding that the defendant was denied effective assistance by counsel’s failure to
investigate and present evidence of defendant’s “nightmarish childhood”); Roe v. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. 470, 483–84 (2000) (holding that prejudice is presumed when the defendant demonstrates reasonable probability that counsel would have filed a timely appeal but for counsel’s deficient failure to consult defendant about the appeal).
Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524–25 (2004) (finding that the defendant’s right
to counsel was violated by the use of inculpatory statements made during voluntary discussion in his home, because the discussion took place after the indictment and without
an informed waiver of right to counsel); Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 686 (1989) (per
curiam) (holding that the right to counsel was violated because psychiatric examination
by state experts to determine future dangerousness of the defendant was conducted
without notice to the defense counsel); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988)
(finding that the right to counsel was violated when a psychiatric evaluation was conducted without adequate notification to the defense counsel). But see Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 424 (1987) (declining to find a violation of the right to counsel for
the prosecution’s use of the defendant’s psychiatric evaluation, because the defense
counsel had requested the evaluation and presumably informed the defendant about the
nature of the exam).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam) (holding that the Confrontation Clause was violated because the defendant was not permitted to cross-examine the
complainant regarding cohabitation with her boyfriend).
Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192 (1998) (finding that the Confrontation Clause was
violated by the admission of a redacted confession that had blank space wherever defendant’s name appeared, and the officer who read confession in court said “deleted” or “deletion” instead of the defendant’s name); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987)
(holding that at a joint trial a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession must be excluded,
even if it is corroborated by the defendant’s own confession). But see Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (finding that at a joint trial a non-testifying codefendant’s confession is admissible if it is redacted to eliminate any references to the existence of someone whom jury would know to be the defendant).
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996) (holding that the right to a jury trial in criminal contempt cases is determined by aggregating the penalties actually imposed); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (finding that the fair cross section requirement applies to venire only, not to a seated jury); Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538
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Finally, while it is far too early in the Roberts Court’s tenure to authoritatively evaluate its approach to the Sixth Amendment, its initial
decisions contravene the popular characterization of the Court as being less protective of individual liberty in criminal prosecutions.
While such a reputation might well be reflected in the Court’s Fourth
88
89
Amendment jurisprudence or its jurisprudence in capital cases, the
Court decidedly has read the Sixth Amendment expansively in a
90
number of decisions involving the right to confrontation, compul91
92
It remains, however, far from clear
sory process, and counsel.
whether this limited jurisprudence evidences a deeply rooted commitment to an expansive reading of the Sixth Amendment or simply
a historical accident due to the particular issues raised by the first set
93
of Sixth Amendment cases to come before the Court.
It is, thus, evident that after a long period of dormancy, the
Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence underwent significant
change during the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, with the
scope and meaning of the provisions of the Sixth Amendment witnessing a series of expansive and restrictive readings. During the
course of this jurisprudential change, the Court adopted several textually inconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment. For example,
contrary to the textual mandate that its procedural protections be
provided in “all” prosecutions, the Court had held that the rights to
counsel and jury trial only apply in subsets of prosecutions, and that
94
too in differing subsets. Moreover, going beyond the text, the Court
has expanded the scope of the Compulsory Process Clause to include

88

89

90
91
92
93
94

(1989) (reaffirming that the right to a jury trial exists only in the prosecutions for serious
crimes).
See John D. Castiglione, Hudson and Samson: The Roberts Court Confronts Privacy, Dignity,
and the Fourth Amendment, 68 LA. L. REV. 63, 64 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
“curtailing of generally accepted Fourth Amendment protections” after the departure of
Justice O’Connor).
See Kenneth C. Haas, The Emerging Death Penalty Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, 6 PIERCE
L. REV. 387, 388 (2008) (arguing that, even as societal concerns with the death penalty
have grown, the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence in these cases “has loosened the standards
for evaluating the competence of capital defense attorneys, strengthened the hands of
capital prosecutors, and upheld strict and constitutionally vulnerable statutory and procedural roadblocks to the appellate review of capital sentences”).
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008); Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379
(2008); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006).
See Stone, supra note 2, at 1534 (opining that the Roberts Court is not protecting fundamental constitutional values).
See discussion of the entanglement of the Predicate Clause infra Part III.A.
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a right to have witnesses testify and has expanded the scope of the
right of public trials to include the right to public pre-trial proceed95
ings. Furthermore, by requiring that defendants show some harm
in order to demonstrate a violation the Speedy Trial, Confrontation,
and Counsel Clauses, the Court contravened the textual mandate
that these provisions apply in all prosecutions, including those of per96
sons who might well be guilty.
Following a discussion in Part II of the Court’s two recent seminal
decisions disentangling the Sixth Amendment, in Part III, this Article
discusses each of the Court’s textually inconsistent readings, explaining how each is the result of the Court’s entanglement of the Sixth
Amendment with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
II. AT A CROSSROADS: THE RECENT DISENTANGLEMENT OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT
The past few years have witnessed two particularly critical developments in the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Commen97
tators have celebrated or decried Apprendi v. New Jersey and Crawford
98
v. Washington and their progeny, noting the important changes they
marked in the Court’s sentencing and Confrontation Clause jurisprudences respectively. As discussed below, however, these two lines
of cases are better seen as part of the same effort to disentangle the
Sixth Amendment from the Fourteenth Amendment and revert to a
more textually-grounded jurisprudence.
A. The “All Criminal Prosecutions” Predicate
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court, citing both the Due
Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment, struck down a state sentencing statute that authorized a higher penalty if the sentencing
judge, rather than a jury, found that the defendant had committed a
99
hate crime. Since the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was pre95
96
97
98
99

See infra Parts III.B, III.C, which discuss the entanglement of the Compulsory Process and
Public Trial Clauses, respectively.
See infra Parts III.D, III.E, III.F, which discuss the entanglement of the Speedy Trial, Confrontation, and Counsel Clauses, respectively.
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. The Court subsequently struck down sentencing guideline
schemes that required the sentencing judge to impose a higher sentence than that which
would automatically follow the jury’s verdict at trial. See Cunningham v. California, 549
U.S. 270 (2007) (striking down California’s Determinate Sentencing Law); United States

506

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:3

100

viously understood to apply only at trials, Apprendi and its progeny
have been both celebrated and criticized by scholars for having ex101
tended that right to a subset of sentencing proceedings.
These
cases, however, are better understood as an attempt to define the
contours of the Sixth Amendment’s unambiguous, but often forgotten predicate—namely that its procedural protections, including the
102
right to a jury trial, apply to “all criminal prosecutions.”
In other
words, as discussed below, rather than extending the right to a jury
trial to sentencing proceedings, Apprendi and its progeny are better
viewed as having disentangled the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, locating some sentencing proceedings—those that constitute
“criminal prosecutions”—within the scope of the Sixth Amendment.
Prior to, and for a period shortly following, the adoption of the
Sixth Amendment, the underlying criminal conviction and the resulting sentence were strictly connected, with the legislature having
103
specified fixed punishments for every crime.
Since the trial judge
automatically imposed a pre-determined fixed sentence after the
conviction, there were no meaningfully distinct sentencing proceed104
ings.
In other words, a criminal prosecution included both the
conviction and sentence. As such, the procedural protections of the
Sixth Amendment applied to determinations of sentence as much as
they applied to determinations of guilt.
The fundamental shift in sentencing policy in the nineteenth century, however, led to the development of distinct sentencing proceed-

100

101

102
103
104

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005) (striking down mandatory federal sentencing guidelines); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (striking down Washington’s mandatory sentencing guidelines).
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (noting that the Sixth Amendment never
has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury’s determination of the appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual); see also Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771 (2003) (discussing which rights are protected at the sentencing
stage).
See generally Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker:
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 216 (2005); Kyron
Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 389 (2002); Benjamin J. Priester,
Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
281 (2001); Keven R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at
Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1122 (2005); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process,
History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243 (2001).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478–79 .
See Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 302 (1992) (“The
facts on which sentencing was based were decided by the jury, so there was little need for
a separate proceeding.”).
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ings. More than a century preceding modern sentencing reforms,
states adopted indeterminate sentencing schemes, affording trial
105
judges considerable discretion in fashioning a sentence.
Under
these schemes, whose goal was the rehabilitation of offenders, judges
were to make individualized sentencing decisions that could be based
on factors not involved in the determination of guilt, such as defen106
dants’ criminal history and personal characteristics.
It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the Court confronted the question of what constitutional rights were implicated by
107
these distinct sentencing proceedings. In Williams v. New York, the
Court faced a constitutional challenge to New York’s sentencing procedures. A New York jury had convicted the defendant of first-degree
murder and had recommended a life sentence; the judge, however,
overrode the jury’s recommendation and imposed a death sentence,
108
Since the
finding that the defendant was a “menace to society.”
judge’s conclusions at sentencing were based on evidence that had
not been presented to the jury (including hearsay allegations of the
defendant’s “morbid sexuality” and that the defendant, although not
convicted, had been involved in thirty other crimes), the defendant
challenged both the lack of notice about this additional evidence and
the lack of a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine adverse wit109
nesses.
Since Williams was a state case, it was not surprising that the defendant, and the Court, viewed these constitutional claims solely
through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. After all, the Sixth Amendment, which since the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights had been understood to apply only to
the federal government, had not yet been incorporated via the Four110
teenth Amendment and made applicable to the states.
In finding
that the imposition of the death sentence in Williams did not violate
the Due Process Clause, the Court distinguished between determinations of guilt and determinations of sentence, finding that the latter
111
properly were governed by different rules.

105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern
Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 278 (2005).
Id.
337 U.S. 241 (1949).
Id. at 242–44.
Id.
See infra text accompanying note 23, which discusses the incorporation of the Sixth
Amendment by the Warren Court in the 1960s.
337 U.S. at 252.
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The Court’s provision of lesser rights at sentencing in state courts
in Williams was consonant with traditional Due Process analysis,
whereby the extent of procedural protections granted by the Due
Process Clause was calibrated to the type of proceeding and interest
112
involved.
This does not mean that the outcome of Williams was
proper—indeed, since the right to notice is one of the most basic,
elemental components of even minimal due process, an argument
can be made that the Court erred in denying the constitutional claim
in Williams. But, for purposes of this Article, the important point is
not that the outcome in Williams might or might not be proper, but
rather that the Court relied on traditional Due Process analysis, not
the Sixth Amendment, in bifurcating the underlying determinations
of guilt from determinations of sentence and granting lesser protec113
tions in the latter.
Distinct sentencing proceedings remained the norm even as the
country veered back to determinate sentencing. Beginning in the
1960s, concerns began to be raised about both the goals of punishment and the methods of sentencing. Specifically, “[r]esearchers
and commentators contended that efforts to rehabilitate the offenders had proved largely ineffective and that broad judicial sentencing
discretion produced unjustifiable differences in the sentence meted
114
out to similar defendants.”
These concerns led to a shift towards
the retributive goals of punishment and determinate sentencing, with
many states, and the federal government, adopting “new determinate

112

See Todd Meadow, Note, Almendarez-Torres v. United States: Constitutional Limitations on
Government’s Power to Define Crimes, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1583, 1583 (1999) (“The level of protection an accused receives under the Due Process Clause often varies with the type of
proceeding at issue and depends on the interests a criminal defendant has at stake.”).
For example, administrative hearings implicate a less robust construction of due process.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Importantly, in recent years, the Court has rejected the Mathews approach for determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause was violated during a state criminal trial. See Medina v. California, 505
U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (stating that the Mathews test is not the proper framework to use
when assessing the validity of state procedural rules which are part of the criminal process). Instead of using a balancing analysis, the Court now asks whether the state practice
in question “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” id. at 445, or whether it “transgresses any
recognized principle of ‘fundamental fairness’ in operation,” id. at 448.

113

This left open the question of whether sentencing proceedings in federal court would
continue to be bound by the Sixth Amendment, as at the time of the Founding, or
whether they would fall instead within the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.

114

Berman, supra note 105, at 279.
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sentencing systems based on ‘guidelines’ that would help to channel
115
the discretion of the sentencer.”
Almost four decades after Williams, the Court addressed the implication of constitutional rights by the new determinate sentencing
schemes. McMillan v. Pennsylvania involved a constitutional challenge to a state statute that required a judge to impose a mandatory
minimum sentence if a defendant possessed a firearm during the
116
commission of certain felonies.
Under the statute, the requisite
factfinding of firearm possession was to be made not by the jury at
117
While the
the guilt phase, but rather by the judge at sentencing.
defendants raised Due Process claims regarding burdens and standards of proof, they also raised a Sixth Amendment claim that the
state scheme violated the right to a jury trial. In summarily rejecting
this claim, the Court stated simply: “[W]e need only note that there
118
is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing . . . .”
The Court’s decision in McMillan, thus, adopted the earlier, Due
Process-based, bifurcation of guilt and sentencing proceedings in the
context of the Sixth Amendment, entangling the two clauses. What
was a perfectly appropriate Due Process analysis in Williams had now
been adopted in the Sixth Amendment context, with no discussion of
the text or history of the Sixth Amendment. While the Court’s holding in McMillan dealt with state sentencing proceedings, this entanglement had important implications for federal sentencing proceedings. As noted earlier, since a “criminal prosecution” at the time of
the Founding involved both determinations of guilt and determinations of sentence, all provisions of the Sixth Amendment applied at
that time to federal sentencing proceedings. By now finding that the
right to a jury trial did not apply to sentencing proceedings, the
Court in McMillan essentially held that sentencing proceedings fall
outside the scope of criminal prosecutions. In other words, a criminal prosecution terminates with the determination of guilt; the subsequent determination of sentence in federal court is governed only
by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
The Court in McMillan, moreover, adopted a formalistic distinction between factfindings to be made by the jury during determinations of guilt and those that could be made by the judge at sentenc-

115
116
117
118

Joseph L. Hoffman, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255,
265 (2001).
477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986).
Id. at 81 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982)).
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93.
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ing proceedings. Finding itself unable “to lay down any ‘bright line’
119
test,” the Court gave heavy weight to whether the legislature labeled
120
the fact an “element of the crimes” or a “sentencing factor.” While
it acknowledged that “there are constitutional limits to the State’s
power in this regard,” the Court concluded that “the state legisla121
ture’s definition . . . is usually dispositive.”
The McMillan majority’s formalistic approach for determining
whether a factual determination is part of the “criminal prosecution”
or part of a sentencing proceeding, while in keeping with the
Rehnquist Court’s emphasis on federalism, drew dissents from Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, who objected to the
Court’s abdication of its responsibility to define the scope of constitutional protections. These Justices argued that undue deference to
legislatures would permit states to circumvent constitutional requirements, including the protections of the Sixth Amendment, by
122
simply labeling essential facts as being “sentencing factors.”
Over time, other members of the Court began to voice similar
concerns. For example, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, Justice
Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
found the deference to the legislature inappropriate where the statute did not expressly indicate that the fact at issue was a “sentencing
123
enhancement” and in fact seemed to indicate the opposite.
The
following year, in Jones v. United States, the Court went further—even
though the structure of the statute had led both the district court and
the court of appeals to find that the facts at issue were “sentencing
enhancements” and not “elements of offenses,” the majority found
124
that it was not an adequate indicium of legislative intent.
It was in dictum in Jones that the Court first articulated the principle by which it would independently distinguish (without undue deference to the legislature) between “elements of offenses” and “sentencing factors.” In a footnote, the majority stated that “any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for
119
120

121
122
123
124

Id. at 91.
Id. at 85–86. If gun possession belonged in the former category, it would be part of a
“‘criminal prosecution,’” subject to the Sixth Amendment’s right to jury trial and would
need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecutor; if it belonged to the latter category, it would fall outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment. This formalistic reliance on the label assigned by the legislature mirrored the approach the Court had
taken in distinguishing between elements of offenses and affirmative defenses.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 93–94 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 95–104 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
523 U.S. 224, 249 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
526 U.S. 227, 231–34 (1999).
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a crime” must comply with the notice and jury trial guarantees of the
125
Sixth Amendment.
This principle formed the basis for the Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey to strike down a statute that permitted the imposition of a higher sentence if the sentencing judge found that the un126
derlying crime was also a hate crime.
While the New Jersey
legislature had set forth unambiguously the hate crime provision in
the statutory section titled “Sentencing,” the Court refused to defer to
the legislature. Instead, the Court, recognizing its obligation to define independently the scope of constitutional provisions, adopted
the principle announced in dictum in Jones and held that “[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be sub127
mitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
While the majority opinion in Apprendi relied on historical and
policy grounds to justify its holding, the concurring opinions provided a textual grounding for the Apprendi rule. Justice Thomas, in
an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, tethered the issue to the word
“crime” because three constitutional provisions were predicated on
this word: (1) the Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”; (2) the Fifth Amendment right in
federal cases to a grand jury indictment; and (3) the Sixth Amend128
ment right to jury trial. Since “[a]ll of these constitutional protections turn on determining which facts constitute the ‘crime’—that is,
which facts are the ‘elements’ or ‘ingredients’ of a crime,” Justice
129
Thomas explained, “it is critical to know which facts are elements.”
The textual tether for the Apprendi rule provided by Justice Thomas, while on the right track, missed the mark. For example, the
word “crime” arises in the Sixth Amendment’s Jury Trial Clause only
insofar as to indicate the appropriate jurisdiction from which the jury
should be drawn; it does not have any implication for the scope of
the jury’s factfinding task at the trial. Instead, Justice Scalia alluded
125
126
127

128
129

Id. at 243 n.6.
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Id. at 490. In subsequent cases, the Court interpreted the “statutory maximum” penalty
in a restrictive manner and struck down state and federal mandatory sentencing guideline schemes to the extent they required the sentencing judge to impose a sentence
higher than that which could be imposed based solely on the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant. See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270,
288–89 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005); Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 500.
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to the proper textual tether for the Apprendi rule when he concluded
in his concurring opinion that “the guarantee that ‘[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury,’ has no intelligible content unless it means that all the facts
which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally pre130
scribed punishment must be found by the jury.” Plainly stated, the
Sixth Amendment’s predicate clause— “in all criminal prosecutions”
—presupposes prosecutions of “crimes” and as such, facts that constitute elements of crime are properly adjudicated as part of the “prosecution” subject to the procedural protections granted to defendants
by Sixth Amendment. In other words, irrespective of legislative labeling, facts that increase the statutory maximum penalty are part of the
initial “criminal prosecution,” not the subsequent “sentencing.”
Apprendi and its progeny, thus, are best seen not as having extended the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to a subset of sentencing proceedings, but rather as a reclamation of that subset of sentencing proceedings within the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s “all
criminal prosecutions” predicate clause.
B. Right of Confrontation
The Sixth Amendment provides that “In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the wit131
nesses against him.”
This Confrontation Clause, which has been
understood to involve at its core four procedural safeguards (in person testimony by witnesses; testimony given under oath; testimony
that is subject to cross-examination; and testimony where the jury can
132
observe the witness’s demeanor), has broad implications for the use
of out-of-court statements that are presented in support of the truth
of the matter asserted—i.e., hearsay evidence. At one extreme, the
clause could be read as precluding any evidence that a defendant is
unable to confront personally, resulting in the exclusion of all hear133
say evidence; at the other extreme, it could be read narrowly as applying only to persons who are offering testimony in court, allowing
134
the use of any hearsay consistent with rules of evidence.
As discussed below, prior to the landmark decision in Crawford v. Washing130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) (first emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845–46 (1990).
Philip Halpren, The Confrontation Clause and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 37 BUFF.
L. REV. 165, 165 (1988–89).
Id. at 165–66.
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135

ton, the manner in which the Supreme Court attempted to steer a
middle course led to the needless entanglement of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence with Due Process considerations.
The path to entanglement began over a century ago in Mattox v.
United States when the Court rejected a defendant’s Confrontation
Clause claim in a case in which prior testimony from two witnesses
was admitted at a subsequent trial that occurred after these witnesses
136
had died.
Since the defendant had been afforded a full opportunity to confront these witnesses at the initial trial, the Court felt that
“considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case” required that the prior recorded testimony be admitted despite the
137
strict requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
Notably, in dictum, the Court drew an analogy to the admissibility of “dying declarations,” a category of hearsay evidence that traditionally has been ad138
mitted despite obvious Confrontation Clause problems.
The Mattox Court’s linking, albeit in dictum, of the Confrontation
Clause and the rules of evidence paved the way for the future entangling of the Sixth Amendment with due process concerns by affirming the ability of courts to “admit out-of-court statements that were
just as reliable as those covered by the traditional exceptions without
139
140
In Dutton v. Evans, for examfinding a constitutional violation.”
ple, “Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion brought the reliability theme
141
to center stage.”
The Court upheld the defendant’s conviction
even though the trial court had admitted the hearsay testimony of a
jailhouse snitch, finding that there were sufficient “indicia of reliabil142
ity.” Notably, Justice Stewart claimed that “the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of
the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that ‘the
trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
143
prior statement.’”
A decade later, the Court fully embraced the centrality of reliability concerns in resolving Confrontation Clause claims in Ohio v. Rob-

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
156 U.S. 237 (1895).
Id. at 243–44.
Id.
John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the
Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 202 (1999).
400 U.S. 74 (1970).
Douglass, supra note 139, at 203.
Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89 (plurality opinion).
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
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144

erts. In approving the use of transcribed testimony from a prior preliminary hearing where the defendant had been provided an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the Court restated its narrow view
of the “underlying purpose” of the Confrontation Clause as being
merely “to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring
145
the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence.”
The
Court then explored the relationship between the Confrontation
Clause and hearsay evidence and identified two principles at work.
First, for hearsay evidence to be admissible, the declarant generally
146
must be unavailable at trial.
Second, the hearsay evidence must
bear “adequate indicia of reliability,” such as “fall[ing] within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception” or having “particularized guarantees of
147
trustworthiness.”
As one scholar concluded: “Reliability has become the surrogate for cross-examination. ‘Firmly rooted’ hearsay
exceptions are the surrogate for reliability. The Confrontation
Clause is simply an exclusionary rule for unreliable hearsay, and the
148
law of evidence largely defines the rule.”
While the Court used this reliability framework subsequently to
149
resolve several Confrontation Clause cases, some members of the
150
Court began to voice misgivings about the Court’s approach. In a
prescient concurring opinion in White v. Illinois, Justice Thomas, who
was joined in the opinion by Justice Scalia, noted that “Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is perhaps incon151
sistent with the text and history of the Clause itself.”
The Court’s
approach, Justice Thomas added, had led to the entangling of the

144
145
146
147
148

149
150

151

448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 65–66.
Douglass, supra note 139, at 206; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword, Sixth Amendment First
Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641 (1996); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic
Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1015 (1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s subsequent treatment
of this framework has tended to make confrontation doctrine resemble ordinary hearsay
law.”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35
UCLA L. REV. 557, 622 (1988) (“[E]vidence law now controls the content of the confrontation clause . . . .”).
See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
Scholars also criticized the Court’s approach. As one scholar noted, the Court had attempted to “achieve harmony” between two opposing interpretations of the clause “by
rendering the preservation of procedural fairness subservient to the pursuit of substantive
justice in the form of accurate verdicts.” Halpren, supra note 133, at 200.
502 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring).

Feb. 2009]

DISENTANGLING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

515

Sixth Amendment jurisprudence with Due Process: “[r]eliability,”
152
Justice Thomas noted, “is more properly a due process concern.”
A little over a decade later, Justice Thomas’s position gained ma153
jority support in Crawford v. Washington.
In an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, the Court disentangled the Confrontation Clause from
due process considerations, stating that while “the Clause’s ultimate
goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, . . . it is a procedural rather
than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by test154
ing in the crucible of cross-examination.”
Having disentangled the Sixth Amendment, the Court then offered a new approach to Confrontation Clause issues. Drawing on
155
the historical background of the clause, the Court concluded that
156
the use of testimonial hearsay evidence would be permissible under
the Confrontation Clause only if the declarant was unavailable and
the defendant had been provided a prior opportunity for cross157
examination; non-testimonial hearsay evidence, on the other hand,
would not be regulated by the Confrontation Clause and would, in158
stead, be subject only to state rules of evidence.
Crawford, thus, “represents a sea change in the Supreme Court’s
159
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.”
It
marks a clear effort by the Court to disentangle the Sixth Amendment from Due Process considerations and to revert to an approach
more consistent with the clause’s text.

152
153
154
155

156

157

158
159

Id. at 363–64.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 61.
Id. at 42–56. In charting this new course, the Court found that the Amendment’s text was
not helpful because it was susceptible to a number of reasonable, competing interpretations. Id. at 42.
Id. at 68–69. In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), the Court drew the following distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are
testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
The Court noted that the dying declaration hearsay exception has long been recognized.
Without reaching the question of whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates such an
exception to the Confrontation Clause, the Court stated that “[i]f this exception must be
accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.” See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
Id. at 68.
W. Jeremy Counseller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington: Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 22 (2005).
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III. THE ROAD AHEAD: ENTANGLEMENTS YET TO BE UNDONE
The Court’s adoption of textually inconsistent readings of the
Sixth Amendment over the course of the past few decades can be
traced to the interplay between the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. As discussed in Part III.A
below, the Court entangled the two constitutional provisions in the
process of incorporating the Sixth Amendment, leading to a textually
inconsistent restrictive reading of the scope of the right to counsel.
Parts III.B and III.C, which address the Compulsory Process and Public Trial Clauses respectively, discuss how the Court entangled the
Sixth Amendment by improperly locating expansive procedural protections in the particularized rules of the Sixth Amendment as opposed to deriving the same rights from the general principle of due
process. Finally, as discussed in Parts III.D, III.E, and III.F, the Court
entangled the Sixth Amendment with the Due Process Clause by using interpretative methodologies suitable for the Due Process Clause
to give meaning to the Sixth Amendment’s text. Each of the entanglements discussed below has led to a more restrictive reading of the
Sixth Amendment, rendering it less protective of individual liberty.
A. The “All Criminal Prosecutions” Predicate
The Sixth Amendment unequivocally mandates that its seven procedural protections be provided to defendants “in all criminal prose160
cutions.” Despite this unbound predicate, the Court has read into
the text a limitation about the scope of the right to assistance of
counsel, finding that this right is available only in limited subsets of
federal (and state) prosecutions. This construction of the right to
counsel, arguably the unintended result of incorporation, is all the
more problematic in light of the Court’s earlier erroneous limitation
of the right to a jury trial to a different subset of federal (and state)
prosecutions. Thus, while the Sixth Amendment’s common predicate continues to mean in all criminal prosecutions for five procedural rights, it has come to mean only in some criminal prosecutions
for two procedural rights, and this some varies according to which of
the two procedural rights is involved. As discussed below, this textually inconsistent construction can be traced to the entanglement of
the Sixth Amendment with the Due Process Clause.

160

U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added).
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Since its ratification in 1791, the Sixth Amendment has guaranteed defendants in all criminal prosecutions in federal court the right
161
to the assistance of counsel.
With respect to state court prosecutions, on the other hand, prior to 1963, the Court had rejected the
claim that this right to counsel was applicable to the states via the
162
Fourteenth Amendment; the Court had instead conducted a casespecific review to determine whether a state’s failure to appoint coun163
sel violated a defendant’s due process rights.
The Court changed
direction during the early years of the Warren Court, holding in Gideon v. Wainwright that the right to the assistance of counsel was so
“fundamental and essential to a fair trial” that it was applicable to the
164
states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Less than a decade after Gideon, the Court reaffirmed its clarion
call by rejecting states’ attempts to limit its scope to serious (that is,
165
non-petty) offenses in Argersinger v. Hamlin. In doing so, however,
the Court used problematic language. Perhaps with a desire to
achieve unanimity—there was not a single dissent in Argersinger v.
Hamlin—the Court held that “no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless
166
he was represented by counsel at his trial.”
Argersinger’s post hoc focus on whether the defendant is imprisoned after a trial without counsel was noteworthy not only for its failure to provide meaningful pre-conviction guidance to state courts on

161

162
163
164
165
166

This right has long been found to include the right of indigent defendants in federal
cases to have the government provide them with an attorney. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938). Even during the common law, while indigent defendants had
no right to have attorneys appointed, and indeed no defendant had the right to have the
assistance of counsel, “[i]t was dogma that the court was meant to serve as counsel for the
prisoner.” John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1049–50 (1994). It should be noted, however,
that this entitlement to the assistance of the trial judge as defense counsel at the common
law was limited to matters of law: “[T]he judges would protect defendants against illegal
procedure, faulty indictments, and the like.” Id. at 1051. As to issues of fact, judges did
not “help the accused to formulate a defense or act as their advocates[, although] judges
did intervene on occasion to help the defendant in the realm of fact, mainly by crossexamining a suspicious prosecution witness when the defendant appeared ineffectual.”
Id. at 1051–52.
See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–73 (1942) (holding that there is no right to counsel
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932) (discussing English common law and state
application of right).
372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963).
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Id. at 37.
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167

whether to provide defendants with counsel, but also because it also
opened the door seven years later to a retrenchment of the right to
counsel. In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Scott v. Illinois held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply to all prosecutions
in state courts, but only to those cases in which the defendant was ac168
tually imprisoned.
Mindful perhaps of Scott’s tortured reasoning, a differently constituted, yet similarly split, Court later found in Alabama v. Shelton that
the Sixth Amendment not only applies to those misdemeanor cases
in state courts in which the defendant is actually imprisoned, but also
in those cases where the defendant, while not actually imprisoned,
169
was sentenced to imprisonment and that sentence was suspended.
The Court’s approach in Argersinger, Scott, and Shelton would pose
no issue in terms of entanglement of the Sixth Amendment if it were
limited to state prosecutions. While it is true that as a general matter,
the substance of each of the Sixth Amendment’s procedural protec170
tions is identical in state and federal prosecutions, the same need
not be true of the predicate “in all criminal prosecutions” clause.
This predicate clause speaks not to the substantive meaning of the
Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections, but to their scope. The
Framers of the Sixth Amendment were acutely concerned about the
powers of a central government, quite the opposite of the concerns
driving the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. So, the Court
could have held that, while the substantive meaning of the right to
counsel is identical in federal and state prosecutions, the right to
counsel applies to different sets of prosecutions: while it applies to all
federal prosecutions, it only applies to a subset of state prosecutions,
171
those where its presence is essential to a fair trial. Such a disentan167

168

169

170

171

See Steven Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 601, 604 (1975); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2426 n.31 (1996).
440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (“[T]he central premise of Argersinger . . . warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment
of counsel.”).
535 U.S. 654, 657, 674 (2002). See generally Rinat Kitai, What Remains Necessary Following
Alabama v. Shelton to Fulfill the Right of a Criminal Defendant to Counsel at the Expense of the
State?, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35 (2004).
See Thomas, supra note 1, at 183 (noting that once a procedural right is incorporated,
“the Court treats the Fourteenth Amendment right and the Bill of Rights right as identical protections”); id. (noting other than the size and unanimity of juries, the substance of
all provisions of the Sixth Amendment that have been incorporated to the states are identical in federal and state prosecutions.)
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193,
1260–84 (1992) (discussing the theory of refined incorporation).
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gled reading would have allowed the Court to adopt the current approach to state prosecutions and would not have changed federal
practice much since the overwhelming majority of federal prosecu172
tions are for felonies.
The Court, however, has failed to limit its Argersinger, Scott, and
Shelton approach to state prosecutions. While not expressly addressing the issue, the Court in Nichols v. United States implicitly assumed
that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in federal court is con173
174
stitutional. Overturning its earlier decision in Baldasar v. Illinois,
the Court held in Nichols that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction can be used in a later counseled criminal proceeding to enhance
175
a defendant’s sentence in federal prosecutions.
The Court’s failure to disentangle the right to counsel, thus, has
led to a textually inconsistent construction of the Sixth Amendment:
while the text unambiguously extends the right to counsel to “all
criminal prosecutions” in federal court, the Court has not extended
the right to those misdemeanor prosecutions where the defendant is
not sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
The Court’s textually inconsistent reading also is not faithful to
the history of the right to counsel. Under the common law, while a
person charged with a felony or treason was denied the assistance of
counsel, the right to counsel was guaranteed in civil cases and mis176
demeanors. The colonists also extended the right to misdemeanor
cases—in almost every instance, the colonies adopted provisions
guaranteeing the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal

172

173

174
175
176

See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 254 n.4 (1982) (“The
number of federal misdemeanor prosecutions (including both 18 U.S.C. § 3401 misdemeanors and 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) petty offenses), however, is so low—approximately 100,000
in 1980—that one can safely say that state prosecutions account for more than 98% of all
misdemeanor prosecutions.”).
511 U.S. 738 (1994). There is some question about the continued viability of Nichols in
some circumstances. As noted earlier, the Court has since held that facts that lead to
punishment beyond the statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. See supra Part II. While the Court has exempted prior convictions from this rule,
those cases have all involved jury findings of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). In uncounseled misdemeanor cases
where the authorized punishment is less than six months (and therefore where there is
no right to a jury trial), there would be no initial jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
As a result, the future use of such a conviction may well require that a jury in the subsequent proceeding make a finding of the predicate facts underlying the misdemeanor
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
446 U.S. 222 (1980).
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 746–47.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932).

520

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:3

177

proceedings. The Framers undoubtedly were familiar with the extension of the right to counsel to misdemeanors under the common
law and in the colonies when they adopted the “in all criminal prosecutions” predicate in the Sixth Amendment.
The Court’s textually inconsistent construction of the right to
counsel proves all the more problematic when considered in conjunction with the Court’s construction of the predicate clause with
regard to the other Sixth Amendment rights. Specifically, the Court
has held that the right to jury trial does not apply to petty crimes—
that is, crimes for which the potential punishment is six months or
178
less.
At the same time, the Court has not qualified the predicate
clause with respect to the other five procedural rights in the Sixth
Amendment. As such, the same text has been endowed with three
different meanings. “In all criminal prosecutions” means the following: in the context of the right to counsel, it means “in felony prosecutions and misdemeanor prosecutions where the defendant is actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment”; in the context of the right
to jury trial, it means “in non-petty criminal prosecutions”; and in the
context of the rights to a public trial, a speedy trial, notice, confrontation and compulsory process, it continues to mean “in all criminal
prosecutions.”
Furthermore, insofar as the Court drew inspiration from its earlier
jurisprudence limiting the Predicate Clause in the jury trial context,
such reliance was misplaced. This is because the Court’s jury trial jurisprudence was fundamentally flawed. In concluding that the petty
trials fell outside the scope of the right to jury trial, the Court had fo179
cused on the word “criminal” in the predicate clause. Referring to
Blackstone’s definition of a “crime,” the Court found that the word
had two meanings: while a broad reading of the word covered all
criminal activity, including misdemeanors, a narrow reading of the
word covered only “offenses . . . of a deeper and more atrocious

177

178
179

See id. at 61–64. Colonies that had constitutional provisions guaranteeing counsel in all
criminal prosecutions were Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey. Id. North Carolina and South Carolina did not have
constitutional provisions, but each adopted this guarantee by statute. Id. Virginia had no
constitutional guarantee but had an act that permitted the accused in a capital case to
have counsel. Connecticut did not have a constitutional provision but expressly rejected
the English rule. Id. The practice in Georgia is unclear prior to the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution. Rhode Island had a statute that permitted an indicted person to employ
counsel. Id.
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73–74 (1970) (plurality opinion).
Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
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180

dye.” “[S]maller faults and omissions of less consequence,” on the
other hand, “are comprised under the gentler name of ‘misdemean181
ors’ only” under the narrow reading. The Court then discussed the
adoption of the right to a jury trial in Article III, noting that the text
182
of the jury trial provision in Article III had been changed at the
Constitutional Convention from “‘the trial of all criminal of183
In other
fenses . . . shall be by jury’” to “‘the trial of all crimes.’”
words, by adopting “crimes” instead of “all criminal offenses,” the
Court found that the Framers intended to adopt the narrow definition of “crime,” the one that excluded misdemeanor offenses from its
scope.
The Court’s reading of the text, however, was fundamentally
flawed. First, “Blackstone himself impeache[d] [the narrow definition] as improper and [gave] full recognition to the broad meaning
184
of the word.” Indeed, since the narrow definition was used perhaps
occasionally, with the broad definition of “crime” being used more
regularly, the use of narrow definition would have been clear only if it
185
was juxtaposed in the text with a word such as “misdemeanors.”
Moreover, even if the word “crime” had two viable meanings and
even if the Framers had selected the narrow definition at the Constitutional Convention, the Framers did no such thing when it came to
the Sixth Amendment. Instead, the Sixth Amendment’s “criminal
prosecutions” language mirrors the original “criminal offenses” language in Article III, which the Court had seen as embodying the
broader definition of “crime.” Finally, the use of the word “all” in the
Sixth Amendment predicate also undermines the notion that the
186
predicate was meant to be limited to a subset of prosecutions.
In addition, the Court’s problematic interpretation of the predicate clause in the jury trial context also stemmed from the Court’s
misreading of the historical record. In a series of cases long before
the right to a jury trial was incorporated to the states, the Court had
180
181
182
183

184
185
186

Id. at 69–70 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *5).
Id. at 70 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 180, at *5).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury . . . .”).
Schick, 195 U.S. at 70. Such a reading of the actions at the Constitutional Convention was
also set forth in an influential article by Felix Frankfurter and Thomas G. Corcoran a
couple of decades later. See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses
and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 978–79 (1926) (citing
Schick, 195 U.S. at 70).
George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 260 (1959).
Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 259–60.
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noted, often in dicta, that the common law and the practices of the
colonies and early states showed that petty trials were often tried
summarily and that the right to a jury trial, therefore, was not meant
187
to extend to petty crimes. The historical record, however, does not
support such a thesis. While it is undoubtedly true that petty crimes
were subject to summary trials during the common law, so were non188
petty crimes. Moreover, as far as the colonies go, many either had
no constitutional right to a jury trial or had limited that right to seri189
ous crimes or even capital cases. Furthermore, where summary trials did take place, the “power to dispense with the criminal jury had
190
been reserved to the legislature . . . .”
Most importantly, whatever the practice of the common law, colonies or early states, the concerns that led to the adoption of the Bill
of Rights were directed narrowly at a central government, one that
was feared might become potentially oppressive or tyrannical. That
is, the federal government stood on different footing and, even if
states, which were primarily responsible for crime and safety, retained
the power to dispense with juries for petty crimes, such power would
not have been warranted for the federal government. In fact, none
of the federal crimes in existence when the Sixth Amendment was ra191
tified was petty.
Nor is the Court’s textually inconsistent construction of the predicate clause defensible on policy grounds. It is evident that the
Court’s desire to limit the scope of the predicate clause in the counsel and jury trial contexts was motivated by a desire to minimize the
192
costs on states. The Court could certainly have imposed such a re-

187

188
189
190
191
192

District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624–29 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195
U.S. 65, 70 (1904); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621, 624 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127
U.S. 540, 552 (1888); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (“So-called
petty offenses were tried without juries both in England and in the Colonies . . . .”);
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 183, at 978.
Kaye, supra note 184, at 246–47.
Id. at 248–57.
Id. at 257.
See infra Appendix A.
See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) (explaining that
the Court was “weighing the advantages to the defendant against the administrative inconvenience to the State inherent in a jury trial and magically concluding that the scale
tips at six months’ imprisonment”); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 188–89 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“It is a cumbersome process, not only imposing great cost in time and money on both
the State and the jurors themselves, but also contributing to delay in the machinery of
justice. Untrained jurors are presumably less adept at reaching accurate conclusions of
fact than judges, particularly if the issues are many or complex. And it is argued by some
that trial by jury, far from increasing public respect for law, impairs it: the average man, it
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striction on state prosecutions under a theory of refined incorporation—it could have expressly chosen to not incorporate the “in all
criminal prosecutions” predicate and instead to require the rights to
jury trial and counsel are fundamental only in subsets of criminal
193
prosecutions in state courts.
With respect to federal prosecutions,
however, this type of “weighing” had already been done by the Framers, who “decided that the value of a jury trial far outweighed its costs
194
for ‘all crimes’ and ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions.’”
Perhaps it was this poor textual interpretation and historical record that led Justice Black to conclude that, by reading a six month
limitation into the jury trial right, the Court was engaging in “judicial
195
mutilation of our written Constitution” and simply legislating “that
‘all crimes’ did not mean ‘all crimes,’ but meant only ‘all serious
196
crimes.’”
Since the Court’s entangled reading of the “all criminal prosecutions” clause is neither textually supported nor historically faithful,
the Court should disentangle this clause. This would mean that all
seven procedural rights of the Sixth Amendment, including the
rights to jury trial and counsel, would apply to all federal prosecutions. For state prosecutions, since the predicate clause need not be
incorporated to the states, the Court’s current limitations on the
scope of the rights to jury trial and counsel would remain valid.
B. The Right to Compulsory Process
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory proc197
While this text speaks
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”
plainly to the “process” for calling witnesses to the trial, not to the

193
194
195
196
197

is said, reacts favorably neither to the notion that matters he knows to be complex are being decided by other average men, nor to the way the jury system distorts the process of
adjudication.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Dripps, supra note 10, at 1568–69 (“While the
states struggled to accommodate the new rules, the Court—even with Earl Warren still
serving as Chief Justice—began to qualify the Bill of Rights guarantees that had been
forced on the states. . . . The Burger and Rehnquist Courts accelerated the process of retrenchment . . . .”); Lawrence Herman & Charles A. Thompson, Scott v. Illinois and the
Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine?, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 76–77 (1979)
(arguing that the Court in Argersinger and Scott was motivated primarily by a desire not to
financially overburden states).
See Amar, supra note 171, at 1260–84 (discussing the theory of refined incorporation).
Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 75 (Black, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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regulation of witnesses’ testimony after they come to court, the Court
has read the right more broadly to include the defendant’s right to
put on witnesses and the defendant’s right to testify. As discussed below, this expansive interpretation has resulted in the entangling of
the Sixth Amendment with due process concerns, paradoxically
opening the door to a potentially restrictive and textually inconsistent
reading of the clause in the future.
The entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause can be
traced to the Court’s decision four decades ago in Washington v.
198
Texas. In Washington, the Court was faced with a Texas statute that
imposed a per se bar against the use of testimony by persons who par199
ticipated in the crime with the defendant.
As indicated by Justice
Harlan’s concurring opinion, the Court could have easily resolved
this case on due process grounds because the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally been the source of constitutional constraints
200
on a state’s evidentiary rules.
Indeed, the Court noted that “the
most basic ingredients of due process of law” include the right “to be
201
heard in [one’s] defense,” which in turn includes “[t]he right to of202
Nevertheless, after determining
fer the testimony of witnesses.”
that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was applica203
ble to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court read the
Compulsory Process Clause expansively to include not only the right
to the “process” for compelling the attendance of witnesses in court,
204
but also the substantive right to have those witnesses testify.
As

198
199
200
201
202
203

204

388 U.S. 14 (1967).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24–25 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the Texas statute is unconstitutional
because due process forbids the arbitrary exclusion of relevant and competent evidence).
Id. at 18 (majority opinion).
Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)).
Id. at 17–18 (noting that the Court had previously found that the Sixth Amendment
rights to counsel, speedy trial, public trial and confrontation were “so fundamental and
essential to a fair trial that [they were] incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment” and holding that the right to compulsory process “stands on no
lesser footing”).
Id. at 14–15. As the Court has subsequently explained, it is reluctant to read new rights
into the Due Process Clause:
In the field of criminal law, we “have defined the category of infractions that
violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly” based on the recognition that,
“[b]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.” The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to
many aspects of criminal procedure, and the expansion of those constitutional
guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause invites undue
interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance
that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order. . . . “[I]t has never been

Feb. 2009]

DISENTANGLING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

525

such, the Court located the right to have witnesses testify in both the
Due Process and Compulsory Process Clauses thereby entangling the
205
Sixth Amendment.
The Court’s entangled reading of the Compulsory Process Clause
206
contravenes the clause’s text and history. The Sixth Amendment’s
text speaks narrowly of the “process” for obtaining witnesses—that is,
the issuance of subpoenas; it says nothing about the regulation of the
witnesses’ testimony after they come to court. Such a restrictive reading of the text is consonant with the clause’s history. The Framers
had soundly rejected a proposal that the compulsory process language be expanded to include the right to a continuance if the process had been granted but not served—the proposal mustered support
207
of less than a fifth of the Framers. As a Framer noted, “[I]f process
was issued, ‘the Government did all it could; the remainder must lie
208
in the discretion of the court.’”
The Washington Court addressed
neither the limited nature of the text nor the clause’s history. Instead, the Court first engaged in a lengthy, but inapposite, discussion
of common law principles concerning restrictions on the testimony of
209
defense witnesses. The Court then stated that “[t]he Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testi210
mony he had no right to use” and accordingly struck down the
Texas statute. The Court’s conclusion, however, was misguided be-

205

206

207
208
209

210

thought that [decisions under the Due Process Clause] establish this Court as a
rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.”
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443–44 (internal citations omitted). As this Article
demonstrates, however, the impulse to provide a more concrete bearing for a constitutional right by locating it in the Sixth Amendment may ironically work to undermine the
Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections.
In subsequent years, the Court, citing to its decision in Washington, similarly entangled
the Compulsory Process Clause with due process issues in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683
(1986), and Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
The Court’s entangled reading of the Compulsory Process Clause also was inconsistent
with the structure of the Bill of Rights. As the Court had noted, the most elemental notions of due process included the substantive right to have defense witnesses testify. In
locating the same right in the Compulsory Process Clause, the Court failed to give independent meaning to the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment.
JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES
AND PERSPECTIVES 1192 (3d ed. 2006).
Id. (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 756 (1789)).
The discussion of common law principles, while relevant to the (due process) question of
whether it was permissible for a state to create per se rules excluding entire classes of defense testimony, was not relevant to the underlying question of whether the Compulsory
Process Clause included two rights: the right to issue subpoenas and the right to have the
witnesses actually testify.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
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cause it ignored the role of the Due Process Clause that, as the Court
itself had recognized, included the right to have witnesses testify. As
a result, the Framers did not commit a “futile act”: while the Compulsory Process Clause only gave defendants the narrow right to the
issuance of subpoenas for the production of witnesses and docu211
ments, the Due Process Clause granted defendants the ability to use
212
such testimonial and documentary evidence.
The Court’s entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause has
also occurred in the context of a defendant’s right to testify. In Rock
v. Arkansas, the Court was called upon to determine the constitutionality of an Arkansas evidentiary rule that prohibited hypnotically re213
The defendant was hypnotized and wanted to
freshed testimony.
214
take the stand after her memory had been refreshed. Although relying principally on the Due Process Clause to find that the total exclusion of the hypnotic testimony was unconstitutional, the Court also
held that there is a compulsory process right to testify on one’s own
215
behalf.
Finally, the Court entangled the Compulsory Process Clause in the
context of an accused’s right to offer a defense. In Holmes v. South
Carolina, the Court faulted the trial court for excluding the defen216
dant’s evidence that a third party had committed the crime. Since
217
the right to be heard is a critical element of due process, the Court
could have based its decision on the Due Process Clause. But the
Court did not do so. Instead, it cited both the Due Process Clause
218
and the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause.
The danger posed by the Court’s entanglement of the Confronta219
tion Clause is illustrated by Taylor v. Illinois. In Taylor, the trial court

211

212

213
214
215
216
217
218

219

United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33 (1807) (“[A]ny person charged with a crime in the
courts of the United States has a right, before as well as after indictment, to the process of
the court to compel the attendance of his witnesses.”).
This is not to suggest that due process grants defendants an unlimited right to have witnesses testify. The admissibility and use of evidence are governed by state and federal
rules of evidence, which in turn are bounded by due process considerations.
483 U.S. 44, 45 (1987).
Id. at 46–47.
See id. at 52–53 (arguing that there is also a Fifth Amendment right to testify on one’s own
behalf).
547 U.S. 319 (2006).
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1967) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)).
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense.’” (citation omitted)).
484 U.S. 400 (1988).
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had excluded a defense witness’s testimony as a penalty for the de220
fense counsel’s willful violation of a state discovery rule.
As the
state had argued, the Court could easily have held that the exclusion
did not violate the defendant’s compulsory process right because the
defendant was not denied the government’s assistance in compelling
221
the witness’ attendance at trial. Such an approach would have been
consistent with the plain meaning of the text and the clause’s history.
Instead, the Court adhered to its broad reading of the clause, reiter222
ating that it also gives defendants the right to present a defense.
The Court, however, found that the Compulsory Process Clause had
not been violated because the right to present a defense is not absolute; it must be balanced against “[t]he integrity of the adversary
process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence
and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and
efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the
223
truth-determining function of the trial process.”
The Court, thus,
incorporated a limitation into a textually unqualified right to compulsory process.
The Court’s incorporation of a limiting principle has opened the
door to a future restrictive reading of the Confrontation Clause.
Consistent with current jurisprudence, the Court could find that a
trial court’s refusal to issue a subpoena does not violate the Confrontation Clause if, using a balancing approach, the trial court had
deemed the potential witness to be unreliable. That is, the same rationale that has allowed the Court to expand the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause turns out to be the means for a potential contraction of the clause.
To avoid such a potential undermining of the express, unlimited
language of the Compulsory Process Clause, the Court should disentangle the Sixth Amendment and revert to a narrow reading of the
Compulsory Process Clause, leaving the resolution of all evidentiary
issues to the Due Process Clause. Under such a reading, while the
220
221

222
223

Id. at 418.
This does not mean, however, that the trial court’s actions were constitutionally acceptable. On the contrary, a credible argument can be made that the Court should have
overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial under a robust reading of the Due
Process Clause: if the evidence being offered was relevant and reliable, its exclusion
would violate the defendant’s right to present a defense and to be heard, especially since
there were alternate means of addressing any harm from the discovery violation, such as
granting a continuance, and since it was possible to punish the attorney personally for the
discovery violation instead of punishing the client.
Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408–09.
Id. at 414–15.
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Compulsory Process Clause gives defendants the right to the issuance
of subpoenas for compelling a witness’s attendance in court, once
that witness shows up, it is the Due Process Clause that addresses
whether the witness will be allowed to testify. Although such disentanglement would not result in a different outcome in any of the
Court’s Compulsory Process Clause decisions (because due process
principles would support the same resolution by the Court), it would
safeguard against future contraction and lead to a doctrine that is
more faithful to the text and more historically sound.
Such a disentangled approach is reflected in the Court’s decision
in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie where the Court was asked to decide whether
the Compulsory Process Clause requires the state to disclose possible
224
exculpatory evidence. The Court chose to resolve the defendant’s
claim using due process principles “[b]ecause the applicability of the
Sixth Amendment to this type of case is unsettled, and because our
Fourteenth Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental
225
fairness of trials establish a clear framework for review.”
C. The Right to a Public Trial
The Sixth Amendment provides that “In all criminal prosecutions,
226
the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial.” Despite this
227
unequivocal guarantee, the Court has opened the door to the possibility that a trial may be held in closed proceedings over a defen-

224
225

226

227

480 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1987).
Id. at 56. The Court added that “[a]lthough we conclude that compulsory process provides no greater protections in this area than those afforded by due process, we need not
decide today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ
from those of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Aron Goldschneider notes that “[t]he public trial clause applies
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” See Aron Goldschneider, Choose Your
Poison: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis of Criminal Trial Closure v. Witness Disguise in
the Context of Protecting Endangered Witnesses at Trial, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 25, 30
n.22 (2004) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968)). He also adds that
the Oliver Court argued that “without exception all courts have held that an accused is at
the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with
what offense he is charged.” Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72). Additionally, Amar has argued that under the Anglo-American tradition, a trial that is not public is
no trial at all. See Amar, supra note 148, at 678.
This is not to say that all parts of trials must be open to the public and press. “[C]ertain
portions of a trial, such as sidebar conferences and in-chambers conferences, may routinely be kept confidential.” Sixth Amendment at Trial, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.
608, 614 (2006).
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228

dant’s objection.
As discussed below, this textually inconsistent,
and entirely avoidable, result stems from an improper entanglement
of the Sixth Amendment with due process considerations.
The Court’s entanglement of the Public Trial Clause can be
traced to its decision in Waller v. Georgia, where the Court was asked
to consider whether “the accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extend[s] to a suppression hearing conducted prior to the
229
presentation of evidence to the jury.” The answer should have been
a simple “No.” The Sixth Amendment’s text after all unambiguously
states that the right to public proceedings has to be provided at “trial.” There is nothing in the text that provides for this right to public
proceedings prior to or after a trial.
Instead, in an opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice
Powell, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public
230
trial does extend to pre-trial proceedings.
In doing so, the Court
drew support from a line of First Amendment cases that recognized
that the press and public had a qualified First Amendment right to
attend a criminal trial, including voir dire proceedings during jury se231
lection.
The Court then used a simple syllogism: since the press
and public have a qualified right to attend pretrial suppression hearings under the First Amendment, and since the Sixth Amendment
public trial right is at least as protective as the First Amendment
rights of the press and public, therefore the Sixth Amendment public
232
trial right applies to suppression hearings.
The Court also noted
that its holding is consistent with the purposes of the right to a public
trial, namely that it allows the public to see that the defendant “is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned,” that it encourages the
“judge and prosecutor [to] carry out their duties responsibly,” and
228

229
230
231

232

A corollary issue raised by the public trial guarantee is whether a trial can be held in open
proceedings over a defendant’s objection—that is, whether defendants have unlimited
ability to waive public trials. While the Court has held that trials may indeed be held
open over the defendant’s objection, this jurisprudence is not inconsistent with constitutional text. This is because the issue implicates not only a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights but also the First Amendment rights of the press and the public. In light of competing textual mandates, the Court properly held that a resolution of the issue should be
predicated on a balancing of the two constitutional provisions. Singer v. United States,
380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965).
467 U.S. 39, 43 (1984).
Id. at 48.
Id. at 44–45 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501
(1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368
(1979)).
Id. at 44–46.
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that it “encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages per233
jury.” Finally, the Court pointed to the similarities in benefits from
234
open proceedings at suppression hearings and trials.
Completely absent from the Court’s reasoning was any discussion
of the plain limiting language of the Sixth Amendment that the right
is to a public “trial.” This is not surprising because the text proves to
be an insurmountable obstacle. Since the right to a public proceeding is limited to a “trial,” the only way to ground the decision in the
text would be to argue that a “trial” includes pre-trial proceedings.
Such a position, however, is not tenable. In addition to the right to a
public trial, two other Sixth Amendment rights are expressly limited
to the context of trials—the rights to speedy trial and jury trial. It is
unimaginable that the Court would agree that these rights could be
extended to pre-trial proceedings, by holding either that defendants
are entitled to have pre-trial proceedings occur in a speedy manner
or that pre-trial proceedings ought to be conducted before juries.
The only alternative for the Court would have been to find some limiting principle that would allow it to extend one trial-specific right to
pre-trial proceedings while not extending the others. There is no
such limiting principle. Simply put, not only is there no textual support in the Sixth Amendment for the Court’s decision, but the text of
the Sixth Amendment actually undermines the Court’s holding.
This is not to say that there are no constitutional bases for requiring that pre-trial or post-trial proceedings be open. There are. These
can be found in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Court, relying on practically the same grounds already laid out in its opinion, could have held that due process, rather
than the right to a public trial, requires that suppression hearings
235
and other pre-trial proceedings be conducted in the open.
After
all, the public trial interests identified by the Court—ensuring that
defendants are dealt with fairly, encouraging proper conduct by
judges and prosecutors, encouraging witnesses to come forward and

233
234

235

Id. at 46 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 46–47; see also Lewis F. Weakland, Confusion in the Courthouse: The Legacy of the Gannett and Richmond Newspapers Public Right to Access Cases, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 615
(1986) (arguing that the Court employed a functional analysis without even considering
whether pretrial suppression hearings were traditionally open).
While it is true that a free-standing Fourteenth Amendment due process claim was not
raised by the parties, the Court has in the past resolved cases on grounds not raised by the
parties. In any event, the Court could have asked the parties for further briefing on this
issue had it wanted to.
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236

testify truthfully —are all consonant with fundamental due process
237
interests of ensuring a fair hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.
This argument—that the Court erred in locating its ruling in the
Sixth Amendment instead of the Fourteenth Amendment—is not a
matter of mere semantics. There is a real danger in the Court’s entangling a due process issue with the Sixth Amendment. This is because the Court has adopted the First Amendment “balancing of interests” jurisprudence in holding that there are circumstances in
238
which the right to public pre-trial proceedings may be overridden.
That is, notwithstanding the fact that the Sixth Amendment does not
in any way qualify the right to a public trial, the Court held that pretrial proceedings may be closed in certain circumstances. Now, had
the Court limited this qualification of the right to a public hearing to
pre-trial proceedings and kept the right to public trial unfettered,
there would have been little issue. But, the Court drew no such line.
Therefore, notwithstanding the absence of any limiting language in
the text of the Sixth Amendment, the Court’s balancing of interests
approach allows for a closure of trials over the defendant’s objection
239
as much as it allows the closure of pre-trial proceedings. The fear
of this textually inconsistent construction of the Sixth Amendment is

236
237

238

239

Waller, 467 U.S. at 46.
See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (“The failure to accord an accused a fair
hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process.” (internal citation omitted));
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”).
Waller, 467 U.S. at 47 (“[W]e hold that under the Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing over the objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in PressEnterprise and its predecessors.”). In the First Amendment context, the Court has held
that the presumption that the trial be open to the press and public may be overridden “by
an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
The Court has subsequently added that there are “two complementary considerations”—
“whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public” and “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question.” Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. (Press-Enterprise II),
478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
See Thomas G. Stacy, The Constitution in Conflict: Espionage Prosecutions, the Right to Present a
Defense, and the State Secrets Privilege, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 177, 251 (1987) (“Waller implicitly
holds that, as in the first amendment context, a prospective witness’ or juror’s privacy interests may overcome a defendant’s qualified sixth amendment right to a public trial in
certain circumstances.”). Instead of this textually inconsistent approach, the Court
should recognize that defendants have an absolute right to insist on a public trial and
that the denial of this right would be a structural error, one that is not amenable to harmless error analysis. See State v. Washington, 755 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
(“The violation of the constitutional right to a public trial is a structural error, not subject
to harmless error analysis.”).
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not a merely theoretical concern. Already, state and lower federal
courts have applied the First Amendment standard to close portions
of trials in clear contravention of the plain language of the Sixth
240
Amendment.
The danger stemming from the Court’s introduction of a new
balancing of interests is accentuated by the factors that are involved
in the balancing process. As noted earlier, not all balancing of interests is alien to the Sixth Amendment. For instance, when a defendant seeks to waive the right to a public trial, there arises a conflict
between two constitutional provisions—the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and the First Amendment rights of the public and the
press to attend trials. In such circumstances, a balancing of competing constitutional interests is unavoidable. The Court’s decision in
Waller, however, involves balancing of a different type. Under the
Waller framework, a defendant’s right to a public trial may be denied
after balancing that constitutional right against non-constitutional in241
terests.
Thus, the unnecessary entanglement of the Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial with due process considerations has opened the
door to a contraction of an otherwise robust procedural protection
afforded by the Sixth Amendment. The Court’s failure to ground the
right to public pre-trial proceedings in the Due Process Clause led it

240

See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 69–72 (2d Cir. 1997) (employing the PressEnterprise I standard to uphold the trial court’s closure of the trial during the testimony of
a witness); Washington, 755 N.E.2d at 424–25 (ordering a new trial after finding that the
trial court improperly applied the Press-Enterprise I standard to close the courtroom during
the testimony of one witness at trial); see also Sixth Amendment at Trial, supra note 227, at
612–14 (“Federal courts have expanded the applicability of the Press-Enterprise I test beyond the voir dire and trial stages. . . . Courts have applied the Press Enterprise I [sic] test to
closures of suppression hearings and post-trial examinations of jurors for potential misconduct. Courts have also applied the Press Enterprise I [sic] test to the sealing of documents, including those that support search warrants and plea agreements, as well as
documents stemming from electronic surveillance. In addition, courts have applied the
Press Enterprise I [sic] test to the sealing of records of criminal proceedings, including posttrial motions.” (footnotes omitted)); Goldschneider, supra note 226, at 37 (“Closure of
criminal trials in New York is exceedingly commonplace . . . .”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Secret Testimony and Public Trials in New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 407, 407 (1998) (“New
York leads the country in denying public trials.”).

241

As the Waller Court recognized, First Amendment cases make clear “that the right to an
open trial may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive
information.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 45. The Court has also clarified that in this balancing
process, “the interests of those other than the accused may be implicated. The protection
of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny may justify
closing certain aspects of a criminal proceeding.” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9 n.2.
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needlessly to locate that right in the Sixth Amendment. While the
Court’s concurrent adoption of First Amendment balancing of interests jurisprudence to allow for the closure of pre-trial proceedings in
some circumstances would not have posed a problem under due
242
process analysis, its use in the Sixth Amendment is fundamentally at
odds with the unqualified text of the Amendment and leads to an
undermining of a critical safeguard of liberty.
D. The Right to a Speedy Trial
The Sixth Amendment guarantees all defendants the right to a
243
speedy trial. Despite the fact that this text speaks solely to the timeliness of the trial, the Court has held that, notwithstanding the length
or reasons for the delay, there may likely be no violation of the right
to a speedy trial unless a defendant has been prejudiced by the de244
lay. As discussed below, this textually inconsistent result is a consequence of an improper entanglement of the Sixth Amendment.
Prior to entanglement, the Court held that the speedy trial right
was meant to guard against “undue and oppressive incarceration”
245
and the “anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation.”
To protect this “impairment of liberty,” federal courts, prior to incor-

242

243
244

245

Due process considerations have traditionally involved the weighing of all interests, including non-constitutional interests. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (“[D]etermining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’
under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry; ‘whether respondent’s constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests
against the relevant state interests.’” (footnote omitted)); Superintendent, Mass. Corr.
Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (“The requirements of due process are
flexible and depend on a balancing of the interests affected by the relevant government
action.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). The Court also held that another factor involved in determining a speedy trial claim is whether the defendant asserted that right.
Id. As the Court recognized, the inclusion of this factor constitutes a departure from the
general rule against the use of silence to infer waiver of a constitutional right. Id. For example, the Court has held that the right to counsel applies regardless of the defendant’s
request for the assistance of counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)
(“[T]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant . . . .”);
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962) (“[W]here the assistance of counsel is a
constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request.”); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“‘[C]ourts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and . . . we
‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’” (footnote omitted)).
Since the use of this factor does not involve entanglement issues, a discussion of its merits
is beyond the scope of this Article.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
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poration, imposed a mechanical rule for speedy trial violations.
This rule applied irrespective of the reasons for the delay or whether
247
the defendant was prejudiced.
However, during the early years of the Burger Court, the Court in
Barker v. Wingo adopted a four-part balancing test and altered the focus of the speedy trial right from the protection of liberty to the pres248
ervation of reliable and accurate verdicts. In Barker, the Court held
that the delay of five and one-half years between the period of arrest
and trial did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy
249
250
trial right.
The Court’s remarkable finding that a multiple-year
delay was speedy might be explained by two factors. First, Barker is a
251
case where “bad facts make bad law.” The first section of the Justice
Powell’s majority opinion begins with a summary of the crime: “On
July 20, 1958, in Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couple was
252
beaten to death by intruders wielding an iron tire tool.”
Second,
although suggesting that the remedy for a violation of the right to a
253
speedy trial—dismissal of the indictment with prejudice —is an “unsatisfactorily severe remedy,” the Barker Court nevertheless accepted
254
To avoid the possibility
that that “it is the only possible remedy.”
that a defendant convicted of a brutal murder would walk free, the
Court had to construct a constitutional justification, which came from
255
the adoption of a due process prejudice requirement.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell began by asserting
that the speedy trial right is “generically different” from any other

246
247
248
249
250

251
252
253
254
255

See Thomas, supra note 1, at 153 (discussing United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880)).
Id.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–33.
Id. at 536.
See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV.
525, 538 (1975) (“To debate the question whether the sixth amendment has been violated in such egregious cases as these . . . is itself to make a feeble farce of the amendment.”).
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Barker, 407 U.S. at 516.
See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973) (holding that the dismissal of the
indictment is the remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right).
Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.
Commentators have noted that the intersection of these two factors may well explain why
the Court held that a five and one-half year period did not violate the defendant’s right to
a speedy trial. Thomas, supra note 1, at 227–28 (“Apparently recognizing the difficulty in
classifying as ‘speedy’ a trial that occurs five and one-half years after Barker was arrested,
the unanimous Court spoke mostly in terms of whether the delay caused doubt about the
accuracy of the outcome, about whether the defendant’s case was prejudiced by the delay.”).
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256

constitutional right. The uniqueness of the right, according to Justice Powell, lies in its vagueness, amorphous nature, remedy, and the
fact that the public benefits from the right adversely to the defen257
dant.
The Sixth Amendment, however, “contains a number of
items which the defendant might willingly forego and upon which
258
the state might insist.” The truer sense of the uniqueness to which
Justice Powell refers is the remedy, which he finds “unsatisfactory
259
when viewed in the light of the ‘amorphous quality of the right.’”
Prior to setting out the standard for a speedy trial violation, Justice
Powell rejected two “rigid” attempts made by lower courts to provide
260
certainty to the otherwise “slippery” right.
The first suggested approach would require the Court to adopt a mechanical time limit,
which Justice Powell rejected out of hand, as it would require the
261
Court to “engage in legislative or rulemaking activity.” The second
suggested approach was the “demand-waiver doctrine,” which would
262
require waiver unless the defendant demands a speedy trial. Justice
Powell also rejected this suggestion as inconsistent with the Court’s
holdings that waiver of a constitutional right may not be waived with263
out consent.
Although rejecting these two approaches, the Court
264
nonetheless incorporated each in its four-part balancing standard.
Under the adopted Barker standard, the consideration of a violation is “trigger[ed]” by a lengthy delay considered “presumptively
265
prejudicial” lengthy delay. Whether the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial will, according to the Court, vary depending on the
266
“peculiar circumstances of the case.” If the length triggers this pre267
sumption, a court must then consider the reason for the delay.
Next, a court must consider whether the defendant asserts the right,
because, as Justice Powell argues, the more that a defendant is prejudiced by the delay, the more likely she will make a demand for a

256
257
258

259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267

Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.
Id. at 519–22.
H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
1376, 1379 (1972) (calling into question the asserted uniqueness of the speedy trial
right).
Id. at 1381.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 525.
Id.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 531.
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268

speedy trial. Finally, a court should consider whether the delay pre269
judiced the defense.
The adoption of the prejudice requirement signaled a radical shift
in the Court’s speedy trial jurisprudence. As noted above, prior to
Barker the Court had held that the purpose of the speedy trial right is
270
Although Justice Powell
to protect a defendant’s liberty interests.
acknowledges this purpose, he nevertheless claims that “the most serious” interest is to “limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired,” which if not protected, “skews the fairness of the entire sys271
tem” and affects the outcome.
Prejudice, however, is “a rationale
that has as its goal accuracy rather than simply the provision of the
272
‘speedy trial’ the Sixth Amendment guarantees.” By relying on “accuracy” and “prejudice,” therefore, the Court entangled the Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right with traditional due process concerns.
A more faithful interpretation of the speedy trial right would re273
quire eliminating Barker’s prejudice requirement.
Such an approach is suggested by Justice Souter’s majority and Justice Thomas’s
274
dissenting opinions in Doggett v. United States. In Doggett, the Court
found that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was
violated when, unbeknownst to the defendant, more than eight years
lapsed between the time of his indictment and the time of his ar275
rest.
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter relied on both the

268
269
270
271
272
273

274
275

Id. at 531–32.
Id. at 532.
See supra text accompanying note 245.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
Thomas, supra note 1, at 163.
Professor Thomas has a similar thesis in which he calls for disentangling the Sixth
Amendment criminal procedure guarantees from the Due Process Clause. Id. at 231.
However, Professor Thomas argues that this disentanglement should only occur at federal trials, as opposed to state trials, which he argues should be decided solely under the
Due Process Clause. Id. at 232. In other words, Professor Thomas proposes that the same
procedural rights have different meanings in federal courts and in state courts. This Article suggests instead that each of the Sixth Amendment’s seven procedural provisions
means the same thing in any context. The Article, does, however, suggest that the predicate clause preceding the seven procedural protections in the Sixth Amendment, which
speaks only to the scope of the rights not to their substantive meaning, need not have
been incorporated along with the procedural right. So, for example, it would have been
proper for the Court to hold that the right to counsel applies to all federal prosecutions
as the text of the Sixth Amendment demands, but only applies to state prosecutions for
felonies and those misdemeanors that result in the imposition of a term of imprisonment
because, under due process, the right to counsel is only critical to fundamental fairness in
these state court proceedings.
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
Id. at 649–50.
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length between indictment and arrest and the government’s negli276
gence in prosecuting the defendant.
Although the defendant was
unable to show specific prejudice from the delay, the Court made its
holding consistent with Barker by “invent[ing] a presumptive preju277
dice arising from a delay of that length,” which, Justice Souter argued, “compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party
278
can prove or, for that matter, identify.” Justice Thomas, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in dissent, however, proposed a more fundamental shift in the Court’s speedy trial jurisprudence. They argued that the prejudice requirement, which is more
279
properly the concern of the Due Process Clause, should be eliminated and that the protection of liberty be restored as the principal
280
protection of the speedy trial.
Under a disentangled reading of the Speedy Trial Clause, therefore, a violation would rest on the showing that the state failed to
281
prosecute the accused in a speedy fashion and the reason for the
282
delay was not prompted by the defendant’s request. Once a defendant makes this showing, the burden should shift to the prosecution
to show that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such a test would have the virtue of comporting with other Sixth
Amendment rights and mitigating the seemingly unjustifiable remedy
of dismissing an indictment with prejudice. Moreover, by removing
the prejudice requirement, the Court could restore the plain meaning of the right to a speedy trial and disentangle the speedy trial right
from the Due Process Clause, which would apply solely to preaccusa283
tion delays.

276
277

278
279
280
281

282

283

Id. at 657–58.
Thomas, supra note 1, at 229; see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (“Thus, we generally have to
recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways
that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.”).
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655.
See id. at 666 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 660–61. Ultimately, Justice Thomas would have denied relief because the defendant suffered no harm to his liberty interest. Id. at 666 n.4.
See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (holding that the right attaches
when “the putative defendant in some way becomes an ‘accused’”); see also Doggett, 505
U.S. at 662 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the prejudice standard should govern
the period between crime and trial).
The use of the word speedy indicates that the length of time should vary with the factors
involved in individual prosecutions, rather than establishing a one size fits all approach to
every type of prosecution. Professor Thomas makes a similar argument; however, he
would rest a violation solely on a showing of delay, “within six months or so.” Thomas,
supra note 1, at 228.
See Amsterdam, supra note 250, at 528.
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E. The Right to Confrontation
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
284
witnesses against him.” This Confrontation Clause has been understood to involve at its core four procedural safeguards, including the
285
right to a face-to-face confrontation. The Court, however, has held
that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and that
public policy considerations may supersede the constitutional right in
286
some circumstances.
As discussed below, this elevation of public
policy over the plain text of the Sixth Amendment has been the result
of an entanglement of the Confrontation Clause with due process
287
concerns of reliability of the verdict.
The groundwork for the Court’s entanglement of this aspect of
the Confrontation Clause was laid in the Court’s decision in Coy v.
288
Iowa. In Coy, the Court considered a statute that permitted a court
to place a screen between the victim of sexual abuse and the defendant that, once adjustments to the lighting were made, allowed the
defendant to see the witness but the witness not to see the defen289
dant. Arguing that the “irreducible literal meaning of the Clause”
is to ensure face-to-face confrontation, the Court held that the use of
290
the screen violated the Confrontation Clause.
While Justice
O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion recognizing exceptions to this
291
rule, the majority opinion by Justice Scalia noted that “[w]e leave
for another day, however, the question whether any exceptions ex292
ist.”
Two years later, in Maryland v. Craig, the Court directly addressed
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause’s requirement of face-to-face

284
285
286
287

288
289
290
291

292

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845–46 (1990).
See id. at 849–50.
See Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 539 (2003)
(“[T]he Court’s present interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is inconsistent, undisciplined, and result-oriented. That indictment is largely due to the Court’s decisions
which ultimately replaced a fundamental constitutional right with a rule of evidence.
This approach resulted in the virtual elimination of a crucial constitutional guarantee.”).
487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
Id. at 1014–15.
Id. at 1021.
See id. at 1022 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that Confrontation rights are not absolute but “rather may give way in an appropriate case to other competing interests so as
to permit the use of certain procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from
the trauma of courtroom testimony”).
Id. at 1021 (majority opinion).
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293

confrontation. In Craig, the Court was asked to decide the constitutionality of a Maryland statute that permitted the trial judge, after
finding that the witness would be traumatized by testifying in open
court, to allow that witness, a victim of child abuse, to testify in a sep294
arate room.
In addition, although the defendant was excluded
from that room, attorneys from both sides were permitted to question
the witness and the witness’ testimony was televised to the courtroom
295
through a one-way closed circuit television. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor held that the Maryland statute did not violate
296
Justice O’Connor stated that the Conthe Confrontation Clause.
297
frontation Clause expresses only a “preference” for face-to-face confrontation and that the underlying purpose of such an encounter and
of the other three elements of the Confrontation Clause (oath taking,
cross-examination, and jury observance of witness demeanor) is to
298
ensure reliability of the evidence admitted against the accused. Justice O’Connor concluded that if the trial is reliable, then a strict requirement of all of these elements would needlessly impede important public policies.
The Court’s opinion in Craig, which used public policy considerations to limit the scope of an otherwise textually and historically unbounded constitutional provision, has been the subject of considerable criticism. Justice Scalia issued one of his more scathing dissents
in Craig. He attacked the majority’s analysis, which he argued “abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the
299
right.” Commentators have argued that Justice O’Connor’s opinion
300
in Craig undermines the presumption of innocence; misses the forest for the trees by improperly balancing the costs of wrongful convic-

293
294
295
296
297
298
299

300

497 U.S. 836 (1990).
Id. at 840–43.
Id.
Id. at 860.
Id. at 849 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
Id. at 846.
Id. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Thomas, supra note 1, at 226 (arguing that the
Court’s tortured opinion “read the requirement of confrontation to be coextensive with
its rationale—to permit the defendant to challenge the testimony of prosecution witnesses”).
See generally Ralph H. Kohlmann, The Presumption of Innocence: Patching the Tattered Cloak
After Maryland v. Craig, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 389 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
creation of an exception to the right to face-to-face confrontation in Craig has undermined the presumption of innocence which is a key element of the due process right to a
fair trial).
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tion against the benefits of eliminating face-to-face confrontation;
and fails to narrowly tailor the exception to important state inter302
ests.
More importantly, however, the Court’s analysis has led to the entanglement of the Sixth Amendment. As Justice Scalia pointed out in
his dissenting opinion, “the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee
reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that were
thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which was
303
‘face-to-face’ confrontation.”
Reliability, on the other hand, is
304
quintessentially a due process concern.
Disentangling the Confrontation Clause by reverting to the brightline requirement of face-to-face confrontation would restore the
305
plain meaning and full protection of the Confrontation Clause.

301

302

303

304

305

See generally Peter T. Wendel, A Law and Economics Analysis of the Right to Face-to-Face Confrontation Post-Maryland v. Craig: Distinguishing the Forest from the Trees, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV.
405, 489 (1993) (“While the Court’s holding in Maryland v. Craig may be defensible from
a macro level point of view, the Court’s opinion attempts to rationalize the holding solely
from a micro level point of view. From a law and economics perspective, the outcome is a
highly questionable result-oriented opinion which provides little guidance as to what is
left of the right to face-to-face confrontation.”).
See generally Brian L. Schwalb, Note, Child Abuse Trials and the Confrontation of Traumatized
Witnesses: Defining “Confrontation” to Protect Both Children and Defendants, 26 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 185 (1991) (evaluating the strength of competing views of confrontation
enunciated in Craig and Coy in light of the underlying purposes of the Sixth Amendment).
Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Thomas, supra note 1, at 226 (arguing
that the Court’s tortured opinion “read the requirement of confrontation to be coextensive with its rationale—to permit the defendant to challenge the testimony of prosecution
witnesses”).
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363–64 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[R]eliability is
more properly a due process concern.”); see Thomas, supra note 1, at 226 (arguing that
while the Court’s analysis would have been acceptable if it was deciding a due process
claim, it is problematic in the context of a Confrontation Clause claim because the Sixth
Amendment “does not talk about due process, or fairness, or reliable outcomes. It talks
about confrontation”).
See Thomas, supra note 1, at 227. Professor Thomas argues that such disentanglement
need only happen with respect to federal prosecutions; state prosecutions could continue
to be governed by the Craig rule because state actions are limited by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
This Article proposes an alternate approach. While it adheres to the traditional approach
that those provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated have identical
meanings under the Fourteenth Amendment, it recognizes that the Sixth Amendment’s
“in all criminal prosecutions” predicate is not a substantive protection, but only one that
goes to the scope of cases in which the procedural protections apply. As such, since the
concerns about a potentially oppressive or tyrannical government were directed more at
the federal government than the states, it is entirely proper that when the provisions of
the Sixth Amendment are made applicable to the states, the Court may circumscribe the
universe of cases to which the provisions will apply. In particular, the rights to a jury trial
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The prospect for such disentanglement appears more likely given the
Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington where Justice Thomas wrote, while “the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, . . . it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but
306
that reliability be assessed in a particular manner . . . .” This principle is equally applicable to the Court’s decision in Craig.
F. The Right to Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides that all defendants have the right
307
to assistance of counsel and this right to counsel has been recog308
nized as being “the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”
This is because an ineffective counsel is “not functioning as the
309
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Prior to the incorporation of the right to counsel, the Court had used
the Fourteenth Amendment to require that, in cases where due process required the appointment of counsel, counsel provide effective
310
assistance. Since the Court’s landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, the denial of effective assistance has been recognized as a vio311
As discussed below, however, the
lation of the Sixth Amendment.
Court has entangled this right to effective assistance by requiring that
defendants demonstrate—not for purposes of determining whether
relief is warranted once a violation is proved, but for purposes of determining whether the constitutional provision in fact has been violated—that the attorney’s performance affected the reliability of the
verdict.

306
307
308
309
310

311

and counsel should apply without exception in all federal cases, but properly can be required only in a subset of prosecutions in state courts.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (“The effective assistance of counsel in such a
case is a constitutional requirement of due process which no member of the Union may
disregard.”); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (noting that “the denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the accused and to prepare his
defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham”); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (holding that due process was violated not only by the failure to give
defendants an adequate opportunity to retain counsel, but by the appointment of counsel
in such a manner as to preclude effective assistance). The same right appears to have
been provided in federal court prosecutions by the Sixth Amendment. See Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1942).
See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146–47 (2006); Strickland, 466 U.S. at
686; McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14.
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During the last years of the Burger Court, the Supreme Court
elaborated on the elements of the right to effective assistance of
counsel in Strickland v. Washington, establishing a two-pronged standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The first prong requires the defendant to “show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and provides that counsel’s performance be evaluated using
“prevailing professional norms,” that there should be a “strong presumption” of counsel’s reasonableness, and that, in reviewing strategic decisions, courts should apply a “heavy measure of deference to
312
counsel’s judgments.”
While much criticism has been directed as
313
this prong of the Strickland test, it is not the focus of this Article because it does not involve any issue of entanglement.
Rather, it is the second prong of the Strickland standard that is the
source of the entanglement of the right to counsel. This prong requires the defendant to show that counsel’s deficiency was prejudicial
314
to the defense. While prejudice may be presumed in some limited
cases, as a general matter the defendant must “affirmatively prove
315
prejudice,” which requires the defendant to demonstrate that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ316
ent.”
Strickland’s prejudice prong is problematic for purposes of this Article because it entangles the Sixth Amendment with traditional due
process concerns. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor stated
that since “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is
317
needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial,” to
satisfy the prejudice prong the defendant must show “counsel’s errors

312
313

314

315
316
317

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–91.
See Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead
End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 82 (1986) (arguing that Justice O’Connor’s concerns about
handcuffing defense counsel are unpersuasive and “[a]ppropriately rigorous professional
standards for appraising counsel’s conduct should not discourage the type of attorney
one wants to attract from accepting in forma pauperis assignments”); Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (arguing that it has weakened criminal defense lawyering and that Strickland’s presumption’s are too burdensome).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. (“Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel’s performance must
be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.”)
Id. at 693.
Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Id.
Id. at 684.
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were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” This reasoning led to the entanglement of the Sixth Amendment not only
because the right to a fair trial has been seen as a distinctly due proc319
ess right, but also because, rather than understanding a fair trial as
being one in which the procedures used were fair, Justice O’Connor
320
defined a fair trial as “a trial whose result is reliable.” Therefore, to
establish a Sixth Amendment claim, the Court required defendants
321
to demonstrate the unreliability of the verdict or sentence, a quin322
tessentially due process consideration.
This entanglement has led to a textually challenged and historically unsound construction of the right to counsel. While the text of
the Sixth Amendment provides that the assistance of counsel be provided to defendants “in all criminal prosecutions,” the second prong
effectively means that the assistance of counsel need only be provided
in those prosecutions where there is a reasonable probability that defendants will receive a favorable verdict at guilt or sentencing.
In addition, the Court’s entangled approach has reduced the prescriptive value of the right to counsel. Whatever might be said of the
Court’s approach in Strickland from an ex post perspective, the approach is deeply problematic from an ex ante perspective. By failing
to require an ex ante inquiry into whether “the defense is institution323
ally equipped to litigate as effectively as the prosecution” and by al318
319

320
321

322

323

Id. at 687.
See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (considering “the defendant’s
right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution”); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (stating that “[a] fair trial is a
basic requirement of due process”); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563–64 (1967) (observing that “[c]ases in this Court have long proceeded on the premise that the Due
Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial”);
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (noting that “the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and
fundamental ideas of fairness and right”).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
See Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
1259, 1266 (1986) (noting that the Court elevated the “correct” result above the procedural means by which that result was achieved).
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363–64 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Reliability is
more properly a due process concern.”); William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin
Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
91, 145–47 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s approach has deincorporated the right to
counsel, making it in essence solely a creature of the Due Process Clause); Thomas, supra
note 1, at 226 (“The Sixth Amendment does not talk about due process, or fairness, or reliable outcomes.”).
See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997). See generally Bruce A. Green, Lethal
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lowing reviewing courts to avoid assessing counsel’s competence by
324
considering prejudice before performance, the Court has minimized the guidance provided by the right to counsel jurisprudence to
325
members of the bar.
Moreover, limiting the right to counsel to those defendants who
might be innocent is inconsistent with the fact the “Framers of the
Bill of Rights intended them to be formidable barriers to the successful federal prosecution of criminal defendants, whether guilty or in326
nocent.”
It is not surprising then that the Court’s approach has been
327
roundly criticized for permitting horrendous lawyering; for making
it difficult for defendants to prove violations in those cases where
328
counsel failed miserably; for being too forgiving of failures to inves329
tigate or present mitigating evidence; and for producing arbitrary

324

325

326
327

328

329

Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 433 (1993)
(arguing for a narrower construction of “counsel” which would “include only those attorneys who are qualified to render legal assistance to a person accused of a crime”).
See Dripps, supra note 323, at 243; Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Towards a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO.
L.J. 413, 458 (1998) (providing statistics on circuit court findings of prejudice and bad
performance under the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel analysis); see also WAYNE
R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.10(d) (2d ed. 1999) (“The Strickland Court
also noted that the question of the adequacy of counsel’s performance need not be considered before examining the issue of prejudice, and lower courts clearly have been influenced by that suggestion.”).
See Duncan, supra note 313, at 6; id. at 20 (“Encouraging the disposition of ineffectiveness
claims without a discussion of deficient performance provides a disservice to legal professionalism.”).
Thomas, supra note 1, at 152.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Seuteuce Not for the Worst Crime but
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (arguing that “[p]oor people accused
of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who lack the skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters”); Geimer, supra note 321, at 148 (asserting that
“many instances of dreadful lawyering are found to be acceptable” under Strickland); Edward M. Kennedy, The Promise of Equal Justice, THE CHAMPION 22 (Jan./Feb. 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/championarticles/A0301p22?OpenDocument
(arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to assure defendants a meaningful right to assistance of counsel and discussing cases including that of Wallace Fugate, who was executed in Georgia).
See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L.
REV. 1433, 1467 (1999) (asserting that the record and transcript may not reflect what
counsel ought to have done, and that there may be no remedy for the “clearly guilty” defendant).
See generally Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life And Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 792 (discussing an American Bar Association study that found Tennessee attorneys had failed to offer
mitigating evidence “in approximately one-quarter of all the death sentences affirmed by
the Tennessee Supreme Court since the Tennessee legislature promulgated its current
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330

reviews in capital cases; for putting reviewing courts in the difficult
position of having to determine from a cold record whether an out331
come during the penalty phase would have been different; for creating an framework that allows reviewing courts to conflate the trial
332
and sentencing phases under the prejudice analysis; for creating
“an almost insurmountable hurdle for defendants claiming ineffec333
334
tive assistance”; and for overemphasizing factual innocence.
335
The prospect for disentangling the right to counsel are bright in
light of the Court’s recent decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, a
case in which the Court was asked to “decide whether a trial court’s
erroneous deprivation of a criminal defendant’s choice of counsel
336
entitles him to a reversal of his conviction.” In response to the government’s claim that the defendant should be required to show that

330

331

332

333
334

335

336

death penalty statute”); Carter Center Symposium on the Death Penalty, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
329, 379 (1998) (discussing a National Law Journal study of capital cases in six Southern
states that found that “capital trials often were completed in one to two days [and the]
penalty phase, a capital trial’s most important part, usually started immediately after a
guilty verdict and lasted only several hours and, in at least one case, just fifteen minutes”);
Stephen Henderson, Defense Often Inadequate in 4 Death-Penalty States, MCCLATCHY, Jan. 23,
2007, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/201/story/15394.html (reviewing 80
death sentences issued in Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, and Virginia between 1997 and
2004 and finding that “[i]n 73 of the 80 cases, defense lawyers gave jurors little or no evidence to help them decide whether the accused should live or die. The lawyers routinely
missed myriad issues of abuse and mental deficiency, abject poverty and serious psychological problems”).
See Amy R. Murphy, Note, The Constitutional Failure of the Strickland Standard in Capital
Cases Under the Eighth Amendment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 179 (2000) (arguing
that the broad discretion for review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims sanctioned
by the Strickland Court “leads to arbitrary determination in capital cases”).
See Jeffery Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 169 (2001) (pointing out that the outcome
of the penalty phase “will turn on substantive facts” which are difficult to determine for
an appellate judge who is “removed from the context of the decision”).
See id. at 170 (illustrating “the undifferentiated application of the prejudice prong to
both” the “guilt/innocence phase” and the “sentencing phase,” and the resulting conflation of those phases).
See Calhoun, supra note 324, at 427.
See Duncan, supra note 313, at 19 (“[A]s a result of Strickland, an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is essentially rendered a viable claim available only to the truly innocent
criminal defendant.”). But see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986) (declining “to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to
the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual
guilt”).
See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 207–08 (2006)
[hereinafter 2005 Term] (arguing that “incongruity between the counsel of choice doctrine [in Gonzalez-Lopez] and the effective assistance of counsel doctrine as established in
Strickland” should be resolved by eliminating the prejudice prong from Strickland).
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 142 (2006).
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the substituted counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e.
that the defendant did not receive a fair trial, Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, answered that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, “commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular
guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be de337
fended by the counsel he believes to be best.” Justice Scalia further
argued for disentanglement by claiming that “the right at stake here
is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that
right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was errone338
ous.”
In his Gonzalez-Lopez opinion, Justice Scalia also criticizes the
Court’s earlier method of outlining the limits of certain Sixth
339
Amendment rights from their purpose to provide a fair trial. As examples, Justice Scalia cites Ohio v. Roberts, in which the Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause was not violated as long as the
340
purpose of ensuring reliability was satisfied, and Maryland v. Craig,
in which the Court “abstract[ed] from the right to its purposes, and
341
then eliminate[d] the right.” Justice Scalia concedes that “the purpose of the rights set forth in [the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a
342
fair trial.” However, he concludes that “it does not follow that the
343
rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.”
Instead, the Sixth Amendment rights have independent meaning and
344
significance distinct from their purpose—the right to a fair trial.
In the ineffective assistance context, disentanglement would mean
that prejudice should be eliminated from the showing necessary to
345
establish a violation of the right to counsel.
Instead, a showing of
ineffective assistance of counsel should rest solely on demonstrating

337
338
339

340
341
342
343
344

345

Id. at 146.
Id.
Curiously, Justice Scalia noticed the tension between the Court’s ruling in Gonzalez-Lopez
and its holding in Strickland, but dismissed the problem by focusing on the fair trial purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 146–48.
448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980) (describing the “indicia of reliability” requirement which the
Court has formulated), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 145.
Id.
See id. at 146 (“The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses,
but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the
Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause.” (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984)).
See 2005 Term, supra note 335, at 210 (“Eliminating the prejudice prong from the Strickland test would thus bring the right to effective assistance of counsel more in line conceptually with the other Sixth Amendment rights.”).
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that the counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Once
the defendant has made such a showing, the court should then address the issue of whether relief should be granted using its traditional approach to these issues. That is, the court should apply the
347
harmless error rule set forth in Chapman v. California. It bears emphasizing here that although the Chapman rule normally applies only
on direct appeal, it should apply to all initial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, irrespective of the procedural posture of the
348
case. This is because courts have not only held that defendants may
properly bring an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on col349
lateral attack, but in fact have required that such claims not be
350
raised until collateral proceedings. Once the Chapman standard has
been applied at the first collateral review, whether in state postconviction or in federal habeas corpus proceedings, then courts
351
could use the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson.
Using this approach will not only result in a textually sound and
historically grounded disentangled reading of the right to counsel,
but it would also lead to a proper realigning of the burdens of proof.
While the Strickland approach places the burden on the defendant for
establishing that the counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial,
under the harmless error approach, the burden would be on the gov352
ernment.
Such an approach would be consistent with the Court’s

346

347
348

349

350
351

352

See Gabriel, supra note 321 at 1284 (suggesting that “once a defendant meets the burden
of proof with respect to counsel’s actions, the defendant need not prove more”); Geimer,
supra note 322, at 139 (arguing that “a presumption of relief should arise” if the claimant
did not receive “that which the Constitution promises”).
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (requiring the government to prove that constitutional errors were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that “[i]f a
defendant shows a substantial violation of any of these requirements” of effective counsel,
the burden shifts to the government to establish a lack of prejudice).
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (finding that the objectives of the
“general rule that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review” are not promoted by requiring a defendant to raise ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on direct appeal and that “[t]he better-reasoned approach is to permit ineffectiveassistance claims to be brought in the first instance in a timely motion in the district court
under § 2255”).
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 450 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2006) (“In general, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not cognizable on direct appeal.”).
507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (holding that on federal habeas corpus of constitutional errors,
the standard is whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)).
See 2005 Term, supra note 335, at 212 (indicating that harmless error review “would shift
the heavy burden of showing no prejudice onto the government”).
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general approach to other non-structural constitutional errors, including non-structural violations of the right to counsel in other con354
texts.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment, framed amidst deep misgivings about a
potentially oppressive central government, mandates that the federal
government provide all defendants seven fundamental procedural
protections. Over the course of the past few decades, the Supreme
Court’s expansive and restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment
have led to constructions that are inconsistent with the Amendment’s
text. These problematic readings, caused by entanglements of the
Sixth Amendment with the Due Process Clause, have led to diminished procedural protections against infringement of individual liberty.
The Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence bears signs of
the Court’s willingness to disentangle the Sixth Amendment and return to a textually grounded reading of the Amendment. Were the
Court to continue this project and disentangle the various entanglements identified in this Article, it would do much to restore the Sixth
Amendment’s robust role in protecting individual liberty as envisioned when it was adopted.

353

354

See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (holding that Confrontation
Clause errors, including the improper denial of defendant’s opportunity to impeach a
witness for bias, are subject to harmless-error analysis); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
691 (1986) (holding the harmless error rule applies to the unconstitutional restriction on
a defendant’s right not to testify).
See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258 (1988) (holding that the harmless error rule
applies to the admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the right to counsel);
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (holding the Chapman harmless error rule applies to violation of the right to counsel at pretrial corporeal identification); Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (holding the Chapman harmless error rule applies for denial of counsel at preliminary hearing); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (applying the harmless error test to the admission of a constitutionally infirm prior criminal
conviction).
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APPENDIX A: FEDERAL CRIMES AT THE TIME THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
355
WAS RATIFIED
Crime

1790
Punishment

Current
Punishment

Current Code

Treason

Death

Murder

Death

Piracy and felony

Death

Death; 5 years,
$10,000
First degree:
Death or life;
Second degree: Term or
life
Life

Accessories to piracy before the
fact
Forgery and
counterfeiting
Rescue of a person convicted of
a capital crime
Misprision of
treason
Misprision of
murder or felony
Manslaughter

Death

n/a

Death

20 years

Death

25 years, fine

7 years, $1,000

7 years, fine

3 years, $500

3 years, fine

3 years, $1,000

18 U.S.C.
§ 1112

Accessories to piracy after the fact
Confederacy to
become pirates

3 years, $500

Voluntary: 10
years, fine; Involuntary: 6
years, fine
n/a

3 years, $1,000

3 years, fine

18 U.S.C.
§ 1657

355

18 U.S.C.
§ 2381
18 U.S.C.
§ 1111

18 U.S.C.
§ 1651
n/a

18 U.S.C.
§ 471
18 U.S.C.
§ 753
18 U.S.C.
§ 2382
18 U.S.C. § 4

n/a

An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112
(1790).
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Crime
Maiming on
Unites States’
property or on
the high seas
Stealing or falsifying a record or
process
Perjury

Obstruction of
process
Rescue of a person before trial
Suing an ambassador or foreign
minister
Violation of safe
conduct, or violence to ambassador or minister
Larceny on
United States’
property or on
the high seas
Receiving stolen
goods

Bribery of a
judge

[Vol. 11:3

1790
Punishment
7 years, $1,000

Current
Punishment
20 years, fine

7 years,
$5,000, 39
stripes
3 years, $800,
1 hour in the
pillory
1 year, $300

5 years, fine

18 U.S.C.
§ 1506

5 years, fine

18 U.S.C.
§ 1621

1 year, fine

1 year, $500

5 years, fine

3 years, fine at
court’s discretion
3 years, fine at
court’s discretion

n/a

18 U.S.C.
§ 1509
18 U.S.C.
§ 752
n/a

3 years, fine

18 U.S.C.
§ 112

4 times the
value of
goods, 39
stripes
4 times the
value of
goods, 39
stripes
Fine and imprisonment at
the discretion
of the judge

5 years if more
than $1,000; 1
year if $1,000
or less
3 years if more
than $1,000; 1
year if $1,000
or less
1 year if not
willful; 5 years
if willful

18 U.S.C.
§ 661

Current Code
18 U.S.C.
§ 114

18 U.S.C.
§ 662

18 U.S.C.
§§ 203, 216

